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NOTE
Insuring R u.de 11 Sanction.§
Federal R ule of Civil Procedure 11 requires courts to sanction attorneys who file frivolou s papers . I Since 1983, when t he rule ·was
amended, atto rney sanctions have em erged as an increasingl y significant aspect of civil litigation in the United States. Estim a tes of the
number of rule 11 decisions appearing in the past six years range from
600 to over 1000, 2 and the monetary sanctions awarded in these cases
have reached amounts as high as $200,000 to $300,000. 3 As t he
! . Th e te xt of F ED. R. C!v. P. II reads as follow s:
Every pleadin g, moti o n, a nd othe r pape r of a party represe nted by an att o rney shall be
signed by a t least one att orney of record in the att o rney's individual name, whose address
sh a ll be sta ted. A party who is not represented by a n att o rn ey shall sign th e party's pleadin g, moti o n, or o the r paper a nd s tate the pa rty's address. E xce pt when o th e rwise s pecifica lly prov id ed by rul e or statute, pleadings need not be verifi ed or acco mpani ed by a ffidavit.
Th e rule in equity that th e averm ents of an answer under oath mu si be ov ercom e by th e
testimon y o f two witnesses o r of one witn ess sustained by co rrobo ra ting circ umstan ces is
abo lished. The sig na ture of an attorney or party constitut es a certifi cate by the signe r that
th e signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; th a t to the best of the s igner's
kn owled ge, information, and belief formed after reaso nabl e inquiry it is well grounded in
fac t and is warrant ed by existing law or a good faith argum ent for th e extens io n, m odificati on, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed fo r any imprope r purpose, such
as to harass or to ca use unnecessary delay o r needless increase in th e cost of litigation. If a
pl eading, motion , or other paper is not signed , it shall be strick en unless it is sign ed
promptly a fter the o mission is called to th e attenti on of th e pl eade r o r movant. If a pleading, motion , or other paper is signed in violation of this rul e, th e court , upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party , or both ,
an appropriate san ct ion, which m ay include an order to pa y to the o th er party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because o f the filing of th e pleading, m o ti o n, or
o th er paper, including a reasonable attorney' s fee.

2. Joseph, Th e Trouble wi1h Rule 11: Uncerlain S IQndards and Mandatory San clions. 73
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87, 88 (over 1000 rule 11 decisions); Proceedings of !he For1y-Eigl11h
Judicial Confe rence of !he District of Columbia Circuit, 119 F.R. D . 461 , 584 ( 198 7) (stat ement o f
How a rd Will ens) (o ver 1000 d ecision s interpreting rul e II); Sc hwar ze r, Rule II R evisiled. 10 1
HARV. L. R EV. 101 3 (1988) [hereinafte r Schwarzer, Rule 11 R evisiled] (more th a n 600 d ecisions
enforcing rul e 11); Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F R. D. 189 , 234 (1 988 ) (688 reported
cases on rul e 11 fro m 1983 to 1987; approximately 200 cases annu a ll y since 1985); N ote, A
Umform Approach 10 Rule II Sanclion s, 97 YALE L.J. 901 (1 988) (ova 1000 rul e 11 cases ). Th e
number of unrepo rt ed deci sio ns and informal invoc a ti o ns o f rul e i 1 may be many tim es large r
th a n those repo rted . S ee, e.g., THIRD CIRC UIT T ASK FO RCE ON fE DERAL RU LE OF C IVIL PR OCEDURE II, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION 59 (1989) [hereinafter RULE ]] IN TRANSITION] (finding
survey data in the Third Circuit co nfirmin g that repo rted d ec isions a re onl y th e "tip of th e
iceberg" with respec t to use o f rule II).
3. Unioil, Inc. v. E .F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548 (9th C ir. 1986 ) (affirming sanction o f
$294,141.1 0), ccrt. d enied, 108 S. Ct. 83, 85 (1987); Callowa y v. Marve l Ent e rtainm ent Group,
111 F .RD. 6 37 (S.D. N .Y. 1986) (imposing $200,000 in san cti o ns), modified, 8 54 F.2d 1452 (2d
Cir. 1988) (affirming $ 100,000 sanction against attorn eys, but vacatin g $ 100,000 sanction again st
client), cerl. granted sub tzom., Pavelic & Lefl o re v. Ma rvel Enterta in ment Gro up, 109 S. C t.
1116 (1989) ; cf In re Yagma n, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir.) ( reversing $250,000 sanction ), opinion
am ended, 803 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. d enied. 108 S. C t. 450 (1 987). Many other cases
inv olv e lesser, though still no t insubstantial , sanction a ward s. S ec, e.g. , Int e rn a tional Shippin g
Co. v. H ydra Offsho re, Inc. , 875 F. 2d 388 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming sa nc tion o f $ 10,000 ); Truc k
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number and size of rule 11 sanctions have grown, so has the interest of
the bench and bar. Judicial conferences of federal circuits have conducted symposia and organized task forces on rule 11 ,4 and numerous
articles discussing the rule have appeared in law reviews and bar publications. 5 The burgeoning literature has analyzed nearly every aspect
of rule 11, from the standards that the rule establishes to the scope of
judicial review that sanction orders merit.
One important but overlooked aspect of rule 11, hmvever, looms
on the horizo n: Can and should attorneys insure against their potential liability for rule 11 sanctions? Altho ugh courts have not yet confronted this question, they may very well need to do so in coming
years. T he proliferation of sanctions presents attorneys with considerable risk. Judges are sanctioning a broad range of attorney behavior,
making it unclear exactly what conduct is sanctionable under the
rule. n F aced with the uncertain potential liability for sanctions, attorneys will likely seek insurance protection. Indeed, a few attorneys
have already begun to pursue coverage for sanctions under their existing professional liability policies. 7
Treads, Inc .. v. Armstrong Rubber Co. , 868 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming sanction of
$12,630.62); Chapman & Cole v. !tel Container Inti. B.V., 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming sanction of 520,000); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Association of Flight
Attendants, 864 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming sanctions of $23 , 106.89); King v. Idaho
Funeral Serv. Assn., 862 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming sanction of S 10,000); Hays v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming sanction of $14,895.46 against a sole
practitioner from a small town); Orange Prod. Credit Assn. v. Frontline Ventures Ltd. , 792 F.2d
797 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming sanction of $54,002.52); In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.
1986) (affirming $52,000 in sanctions); Carlton v. Jolly, 125 F.R.D. 423 (E.D. Va. 1989) (imposing S 12,500 in sanctions); Gutterman v. Eimicke, 125 F.R.D. 348 (E.D. N .Y. 1989) (imposing
$12,555 in sanctions); Anschutz Petroleum Mktg. Corp. v. E.W. Saybo1t & Co., 112 F.R.D. 355
(S. D.N. Y. 1986) (imposing sanction of $32,00 l. 98). A recent survey of rule 11 opinions rev ealed
that the average rule 11 sanction is $44,118 and the median sanction is $5,153. T. WII.LGING,
THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 30, 80 ( 1988).
4. See, e.g., Proceedings of !he Forly-Eig!Jih Judicial Conference of th e District of Columbia
Cirelli!, supra note 2; RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, supra note 2; cf NEW YORK STATE BAR AssoCI.-\TIO l" COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES (1987).
5. See. e.g.. Carter, The His wry and Putposes of Rule II, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 4 ( 19 85);
Joseph, Rule 11 is Only !he Beginning. A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 62; Maute, Sanctions: Are
They Changing !he Liligation Game Rules?. TRIAL, Oct. 1988, at 67: Nelken, Sanelions Under
Amended Federal Rule I1 -Some "Chilling" Problems in 1he S!rugglc Between Compensation
an d Punishm ent, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986); Parness, More Slringent Sanctions Under Federal
Civil Rule 1I: A Reply 10 Professor Nelken . 75 GEO. L.J. 1937 (1987); Pope & Benkoczy, A
Comprehensive Guide 10 Sane/ions Under Rule 11. 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 389 ( 1988); Schwarzer,
Sancrions Under The New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look. 104 F.R.D. 18 1 ( 1985) [hereinafter
Schwarzer, Sanctions: A Closer Look]; Schwarzer, Rule 1I Revisited, supra note 2; Vairo, supra
note 2; Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sane/ions, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 630 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Plausible Pleadings]; Note, Applying Rule I 1 to Rid Courts of
Frivolous Li1igation Without Chilling the Bar:> Crealivily, 76 KY. L. J. 891 (1987-88) [hereinafter
Note, Applying Rule 11]; Note, The Dynamics of Rule I 1: Preventing Frivolous LiligrJtion by
Demanding Professional Responsibilily, 61 N.Y. U. L. REv. 300 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The
Dynamics of Rule I1]; Note, supra note 2.
6. See infra notes 12-13, 25-50 and accompanying text.
7. See RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 127 (Out of 34 attorneys surveyed who had
been in vo lved in sanction motions, one attorney is filing a claim for coverage of sanctions im -
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Can these and other attorneys fin d coverage for sanctions under
their existing policies? Should they be allowed to obtain coverage for
sanctions at all? This Note addresses these questions and attempts to
sketch the landscape surrounding th e looming issue of insurance coverage for rule 11 sanctions. To determine whether sanctions can and
should be insurable, it is necessary first to understand the scope of the
risk of rule 11 sanctions. Part I of this Note outlines the unsettled
standards, purposes, and practices of rule 11 that make insuring sanctions both attractive and problematic.8 As discussed in Part I, judges'
views vary widely both as to what conduct is sanctionable and as to
what type of sanctions to impose. M any attorneys, therefore, cannot
be certain whether their actions will be subj ect to costly sanctions .
To alleviate this uncertainty, attorneys concerned with the growing
risk of rule 11 sanctions are likely to seek insurance coverage. Parts II
and HI of this Note explore two potential sources of insurance coverage for sanctions. The first place attorneys will look for coverage will
be in existing professionai liability policies. Part II, therefore, examines whether current attorney professional liability policies cover rule
11 sanctions and concludes that, depending on the doctrine of interpretation used, courts could find that some of these policies cover rule
11 sanctions. 9 Even if existing policies do not cover such sanctions,
however, attorneys may still seek, and ins urers may offer, separate policies specifically designed to cover rule 11 sanctions. Part III, therefore, discusses the market requirements of in surability and shows that
insurers may willingly offer special rule 11 insurance fo r attorneys. 10
Given the potential fo r rule 11 insurance coverage under either existing or new policies, should courts enforce such policies? Part IV
considers this question and the public policy issues raised by insurance
coverage of rule 11 sanctions. 1 1 T his final Part concludes that, at least
for now, rule 11 insurance should be allowed and enforc ed by the
courts . The ultimate resolution of the public policy issues presented
by rule 11 insurance will depend on the role that the rule is to play in
civil litigation; however, at the present time this role is far from clear.
Absent a consensus on the purpose and sco pe of rule 11, any attempt
to prohibit rule 11 insurance on public policy grounds will be premaposed against h im. ); teleph o ne interv i'" \\. wii h Re be rt Cu bbin. C o un sel fo r Micl1iga n L a wyers
Mutual In s urance Co . (Scp:cmbe r 1. l q8 8) (In riJc pst yea r. two attorn e ys have notified com pany of potential clain1 s for sanc ti on s.). Fu n h~rrn o r e , t\VO bri Lf ani c les on th e cover3 gc of san ct io ns under profession a l li ab ilit y po lici es ha 1 e appea red in insura nc e law journals, po rtending a
gro win g int e rest by att o rn eys and ;n sure rs in th t.: in su rabi!i:y issu e. Hamilton, Mc K ee & Levitt,
!nsurabili1y of M onewry San Ciions Under .-iuoritey J:::rrors and Omissions Policies. 5~- D El '.
CouNS. J. 520 (1987): Th o mse n , l nsurana Col'cragc fo r So noions Im posed Under Amended
Federal R ule 11. 38 F EDN . INS. & C O!W CO U'S Q. 29.3 (1 9 88).
8. See infra not es 12-84- and accompa nying tn t
9. See itzfra notes 85 -!50 and accom pa ny tn g te xt.

10. See infra notes 151-82 a nd acco mpanying tex t.
11 . See infra not es 183·250 a nd acc o mp a n ying text.
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ture. M oreover, insurance coverage for sanctions would make a positive contribution in its own right to the functioning of rule 11.
Insurance would advance the compensatory ends of the rule, and it
would alleviate any chilling of creative advocacy caused by the rule.
T he availability of insurance coverage would foster a better balance
between the competing public policies of judicial efficiency and vigorous, creative representation in the courts.
I.

THE RISK OF RULE

11

SANCTIONS

Practicing law under rule 11 has been variously described as "negotiating a minefield" 12 or playing a game of Russian roulette. 13
Although these metaphors may sound extreme, they capture the essence of the risk of rule 11 sanctions. Attorneys today face the possibility of being sanctioned without knowing in advance what type of
behavior a particular judge will find violates the rule. T he standards
of conduct under rule 11 lack uniformity and certainty, and the sanctions that can be imposed are discretionary with the court. Moreover,
neither courts nor commentators agree on the purpose of rule 11 sanctions, and this lack of consensus has led to uneven, and at times inconsistent, application of the rule.
The growing uncertainty over attorney sanctions stems from the
1983 amendments to rule 11. Before that time, the rule posed little
risk because courts rarely invoked it. 14 T he former rule 11 required
attorneys to sign each pleading filed with the court, thereby certifying
that the pleading was well-grounded and "not interposed for delay." 15
Courts could strike pleadings signed with the "intent" to violate rule
11 16 and could discipline attorneys who willfully violated the rule. 17
Courts seldom used the former rule, however, because it applied only
to pleadings; it required a showing of bad faith ; and it provided for
only two limited sanctions. 18
12. Joseph, supra not e 2, a t 89.
13. M a ndelbaum, Amended Rule II: Despite Wide Application, Lillie Consensus Observed, 3
iNSIDE LITI GAT ION (P-H) I, 18 (Jul y 1989 ) (quoting Professor George Co chra n, Univer;, ity of
Mississippi).
14. See Risinge r, Honesty in Pleading and It s Enforcem ent: Some "St riking" Problems with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure II. 61 M INN. L. R EV. I, 34- 37 (1976) (o nl y 23 cases repo r ted
fr o m 1938 to 19 76 in whic h sa nct io ns were so ught ; rule !I wa s fo und to have bee n viola ted in
on ly II of th ese c;1ses) .
15. FED. R. C tv. i'. I I (1980 ) (a mended 19 83 ).

16. !d.

I
I
\

J

17. !d. See also Carter, supra note 5, a t 7-8 (fo rmer rule II on ly au th orized two typ.:s of
sa nctions: strikin g pl eadi ngs a nd disciplining a tt o rney s).
18. See Nelkcn, supra not e 5, at 13 15 - 16 (former rul e II rare ly in" o ked because of" 'mea nin gless sa nction s' a nd 'so ft st a ndard s'" ); Oliphant , R ule 11 San u ions and Standards. 12 WM.
M ITC H ELl. L. REv. 73 1, 735 ( 19 86) (diffi c ulty of meeting burd e n of bad fa ith under fe rm e r rul e);
Sc hwarzer, Sanctions: A Closer Look, supra note 5, at 183 (form er rul e II ra rely invok ed because
"s trikin g of a pleading was an ineffect iv e pena lt y"). S ee generally C arter. supra not e 5, a t 4-9.
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The 1983 amendments, however, expanded the scope of rule 11
and strengthened courts' ability to enforce it . 19 Under the nev; rule,
attorneys must sign, in addition to pleadings, all motions and other
papers filed with the court. An attorney's signature now certifies that
the attorney has read the paper and that - "to the best of [the attorney's] knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in quiry" - the paper is well-grounded in fact, warranted by existing law
or a good fai th extension of existing law, and not filed fo r any improper purpose such as harassment or delay. 20 The amended rule generally replaces the subjective standard of the former rule with an
objective one of "reasonableness under the ci rcumstances." 2 1 It also
requires the court, on the motion of a party or on its own initiative,22
to impose "an appropriate sanction" on attorneys who sign papers in
violation of the rule. 2 3
P redicting what a particular court will find " reasonable" or "appropriate," though, is an uncertain undertaking.24 By expanding rule
11 's standards and giving courts discretion to craft a variety of sanctions, the drafters of the 1983 amendments created a new risk for atto rneys practicing in the federal courts. In addition, by failing to
explicate clearly the role that rule 11 sanctio ns should play in civil
litigation, the drafters failed to give courts the guidance needed to apply the rule uniformly and thereby to minim ize uncertainty.
A.

Broad S tandards

The new rule imposes three requirements on attorneys for every
paper they sign and file in court. First, attorneys must make a reasonable inquiry into the facts underlying their papers' assertions. Second,
they must make a reasonable inquiry into the underlying law to determine that their papers are supported by existing law or a " good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law ."
19. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 11 adv iso ry committee's note (e xp la ining that a greate r range of
ci rc umstances would cons titut e a vio lat io n of t he new ru le and desc ri bin g the expans ion o f avail able sa nc ti ons).

20. FED. R . Ctv. P. 11 .
2 1. FED. R. C tv. P. 11 a d v isory co mmittee·s no te ("'T he sta nda rd is o ne of reasonableness
u nd e r the c ircum s ta nces."). See infra no tes 25 -50 a nd acco m pa ny in g text. Des pit e the obj ect ive
sta ndard of the amended ru le, it is co nc e ivab le tha t, in pract ice, judges on ly impo se sa nct ions
whe re an attorney h as violated th e rule in bad faith. Emp irical resea rc h on ru le 11, however,
does not reveal such a prac ti ce. SeeS. KASSI N , AN Ef\tP IRICAI. STU DY OF RU L E 11 SANCT i m<s
18-23 (1985) (60 % o f th e judges s urv eyed who perceiv ed a " no n willful" violation of rul e 11 st ill
imposed sanctions of attorneys ' fees; 53% of th e judges wh o beli eved that rule 11 had bee n
vio lated without "bad fa ith " st ill imposed sanctions) .
22. See, e.g., S ni pes v. United States, 7 11 F. Supp. 827 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (su a sponte im posi tio n o f sa ncti o ns by cou rt).
23. FED. R. C tv. P . 11.
24. See Schwa rze r , Rule II R el'isited, supra not e 2, at 10 17 ('" (T ] here is good ground for
a rg uin g th at th e s tandard a co urt wi ll a pp iy und e r ru ie ! l is unpredictable .").
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Third, they mus t not fi le papers for any improper purpose. 25 A s
straightforward as these requirements may seem , each has led to broad
a nd uncertain standards for measuring compliance wi th the rule. 26 As
this section demonstrates, judges do not agree on what cond uct is
sanctionable unde r the rule, 27 and attorneys can be sanctioned even
when they file an obj ectively frivolous paper in good faith. 28
T he first and second requirements impose a broad ob ligation of
reasonable inqui ry. 2 9 Attorneys m ust conduct t he type of investigation that a " reasona ble attorney" would make under the circumstances to assure that a paper is factua ily and legally supportable. 30
Yet no m atter what type of fac tual inquiry an attorney makes, arguably he can al ways do more. 31 M oreover, in a common law system it
can be difficult to find any argument that is neither ' \ varranted by
existing law [n]or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." 32
25. On the requirements of rule II generally, see, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc.,
836 F.2d 866. 873-74 (5th Cir. !988) (en bane); Szabo Food Serv., lnc. v. Canteen Corp., 823
F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1987). cerr. dismissed. 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); Schwarzer, Sanctions: A
Closer Look, supra note 5. at 184-85.
26. See. e.g. , Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (The standards for
imposing sanctions "have not always been either clear or consistently applied."), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 918 (1987); G. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 31 (1989)
(The standards for sanctions are "uncertain."); Cavanagh, Developing Srandards Under Amended
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HoFSTRA L. REV. 499. S 14 (1986) ("[T]he
new criteria for attorney conduct are somewhat amorphous.'").
27. See. e.g.. S. KASSIN, supra note 21, at 45 ("[T]here is a good deal of interjudge disagreement over what actions constitute a violation of the rule.'"); RULE II IN TRANSITION, supra note
2, at 95 (finding "inconsistent enforcement" of rule II in Third Circuit); Maute, supra note 5, at
69 (noting "substantial disagreement"' among the courts over what conduct is sanctionable);
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 2, at 1016 (Different courts "have not applied the rule
in the same way.").
28. See. e.g.. East way Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243. 253 (2d Cir. 1985)
("Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did.").
29. See. e.g.. 762 F.2d at 253 ("Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative
duty on each anorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is
signed."); G. JosEPH . supra note 26, at 97-98.
30. See Cabell v. Petty , 810 F.2d 463. 466 (4 th Cir. ! 987) (test of rule 11 is "whether a
reason able attorney in like circumstances could believe his actions to be factually a nd legally
justified"). Bul see·"· · M IL LER, THE AUGUST 1983 AiYlENDM ENTS TO THE FE DE RAL RUL ES Of
CIVIL PROCEDURE 15 (Federal Judicial Center 1984) (The reasonable inquiry requirement "has
got some subjective elements to it, but it is an attempt to become more objective.").
31. S ee T. WILLGING, supra note 3, at 50. Indeed, some courts have suggested that attorneys hav e a continuing duty to investigate facts. See, e.g., Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858
F.2d 332, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1988) ("'[T]he reasonable inquiry required und er Rule II is not a onetime obligation .... [A party] is impressed with a continuing responsibility to review and reevaluate his pleadings and where appropriate modify them to conform to R ule 11. "') . But see T homas
v. Capital Sec. Servs., inc. , 836 F. 2d 866, 875 (5th C ir. 1988) ("[T]he review of an attorney's
conduct for Rule ! l purposes is isolated to the moment the paper is signed . . . . ");Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Rule 11 applies only to the initial signing of a
' pleading, motion or other paper.' '"), cert. denied. 480 U .S. 918 (1987).
32. On the difflcul ty of determining whether a leg al argument is frivolou s. see Levinson ,
Frivolous Casn: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything At A !!?, 24 OsGOODE H ALL L.J. 353 (1986).
This difficulty is especially acute in areas of the law that are rapidly changing. See. e.g. ,

.,.

l
350

JV!ichigan Law Review

i

[Vol. 88:344

What constitutes a reasonable inquiry will therefore vary from case
to case and from judge to judge. 33 As the advisory committee acknowledged, the reasonableness of an inquiry depends on a variety of
factors: the amount of time an attorney had available; \Vhether the
attorney had to rely on a client for information; whether the paper was
based on a " plausible" legal argument; or vvhether the attorney depended on co- counseL34 In deciding whether conduct is sanctionable,
judges may also be inftuenced by \Vhether the violation of the rule 'Nas
n1alicious or simpiy c a re1e=~s. 35 Given these various factors) it is no t
surprising that some judges fir:d a particular type of behavior sanction~
able while others find it permissible. 36 As one federal judge has observed, "what a judge will fin d to be objectively unreasonable is very
much a matter of that judge's subjective determination." 37
Like the first two requirements, the standard for the t hird requirement, that a paper not be interposed for any improper purpose, also
introduces uncertainty. 38 Rule 11 states that filing a paper "to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of the
litigation" constitutes improper purpose. 39 A lthough the rule does not
mention bad faith or subjective intent, 40 determining whether a paper
was filed to harass or to cause delay presumably must involve some
inquiry into the attorney's intent. 41 This can be difficult to do, however, and subjective inquiries may contravene the objective standard
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 2, at 1017. Uncertainty over what courts regard as
"warranted'" by existing law, that is. what constitutes a plausible argument under existing law,
adds to rule 11 's risk. See Note, Plausible Pleadings, supra note 5, at 641 ("When courts use
narrow or unclear standards of [legal] plausibility in applying rule 11, they increase the risk to
lawyers of practicing simplified pleading.").
33. See Elson & Rothschild, Rule I 1: Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 363
(1988) ("[S]uch "objective' requirements as that there be 'reasonable inquiry· and that the pleading be factually 'well grounded' and legally 'warranted" are hardly precise; each calls for the
exercise of individual judgment by the parties and by the court."); cf Aminoil, Inc. v. United
States, 646 F. Supp. 294. 298 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (observing in a different context that "'[w]hat may
be considered reasonable by one court may be found unreasonable by another").
34. FED. R. Clv. P. 11 advisory committee·s note. See generally G. JosEPH. supra note 26,
at 101-30, 140-57.
35. See Schwarzer, Rule J I Rc>•isired, supra note 2, at 1016.
36. See supra note 27.
37. Schwarzer, Rule I I Revisiu:d, supra note 2, at 1016; see also G. JosEPH, supra note 26, at
1.
38. See generally Shaffer, Rule 1 I: Bright Light. Dim Future, in SANCTIONS:
1, 10-11 (G. Joseph, P. Sandler & C. Shaffer 2d ed. 1988).

RULE

11

AND

OTHER POWERS

39. FED. R. C!v. P. i 1.
40. In fact, the <Jdvisory committee's note explicitly states that the new rule abandons the
element of willfulness found in the former rule in favor of an objective test of "reasonableness
under the circumstances ... fED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
41. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., lnc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding that. on remand, "the district court must find out why Szabo-Digby pursued this litigation"), cert. dismissed. 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); Nelkcn, supra note 5, at 1320 (arguing that "the
improper purpose standard requires that the court attempt to fathom the motives of the signer'").
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intended by the drafters of the amended rule. 42 A number of courts
and commentators have therefore adopted a purely objective approach
to the improper purpose prong of rule 11. 4 ' In Zaldivar v. City of Los
A ngeles, 44 for exam ple, the Ninth Circuit held that regard less of the
plaintiff attorney's state of mind , a defendant can not be "harassed"
under ru le 11 as long as the complaint " com plies wit h the 'well
g tounded in fact and warran ted by existing b.w' clause of the R ule." 45
By this vievv, if the paper satisfies the first tv.;o req uirements of reasonablen,ess in fact and law, it then per se satisfies the thi rd requirement of
proper purpose. 46 A ll aspects of rule 11 are then based on th·~ notion
of " reasonableness."
Although some courts dispute that rule 11 is completely objecti ve,47 most agree that amended rule 11 has at least more of an objective standard than the previous ruleY' The amended rule, therefore,
"is more stringent than the original good-faith formu la and thus . . . a
greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation. " 49 Attorneys
can be - and are - sanctioned even when they act in good faith. 50
42. See Schwarzer, Sane! ions: A Closer Look. supra note 5, a t 195-96 (descri bing the dangers
and difficulties with a su bjec tive approach to improper purpose). Bul see Nelke n, supra note 5, at
1321 n.51 ("The rulemakers, ... in incorpora tin g and ex panding the 'delay' provision of the old
ru le, have retain ed its subjective element.").
43. See, e.g.. Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[A)
complain t that is well-grounded in fact and law cannot be sanctioned regardless of counsel's
subjective intent."); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F2d !265, 1275 (2d Cir. !986) (rule ll contains
no subjective element), eerl. denied, 480 U.S. 91 8 (1987); C ity of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co.,
649 F. Supp. 716, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[E]ven a bad faith motive does not justify Rule 11
sanctions, where ... the court has concl ud ed that the arguments advanced are not lacking in
colorable legal support."); Schwarzer, San e/ions: A Closer Look , supra not e 5, at 196 ("If a
reasonably clear legal justification can be shown for th e filing of the paper in qu estio n, no improper purpose can be found and sanctions are inappropriate.· ·).
44. 780 F2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. 780 F.2d at 832.
46. Conversely, some cou rts and commentators infer imp ro per purpose from the failure to
sa ti sfy the first two requirement s. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 833 F.2d
1489, 1491 (llth Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 "incorporates a n objective sta nda rd in assessing bad
fa ith .. '); In re T Cl Ltd., 769 F. 2d 441,445 (7th Cir. 19 85) (An a ttorney' s behavior is improper if
it is unreaso nable.); Schwarzer, Sane1ions: A Closer Look , supra note 5, a t 196 (improper purpose
objectively measured by unreaso nabl e behavior).
47. See, e.g., Szabo F ood Serv., Inc. v. Ca nt ee n Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th C ir. 1987)
(Rule ll retain s a "su bjecti ve component."), eer1. dismissed. 108 S. Ct. l iO l (198 8); Robinson v.
National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 11 30 (5th Cir. 1987) (Papers well· grounded in fact
a nd law may sti ll viola te the improper purpose cla use o f rule ll.); Terpstra v. Farm ers &
Merchants Bank, 634 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. lnd. 198 5) (plaintiffs sanctioned for filing suit in bad
faith) . Sec generally G. JOS EPH, supra no te 26, at 184 -86 (discussing circuit sp lit on th e standa rd
for improper purpose).
48. See. e.g.. Thornton v. Wah l, 787 F2d 1151 , 1154 (7th Cir. 1986) ("An emp ty head but a
pure hea rt is no defense."); Westmoreland v. CBS, In c., 770 F. 2d 11 68 , 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(ru le 11 in corporates an objective sta ndard); Shaffer. supra note 38 , at 2· 3 (' ·[I)t is now settled
that subjective good faith is not eno ugh."); Note. The Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 5, at 31516 (co urts ge ne rally recognize objective s tandard).
49. FED. R. Crv. P. ll adviso ry committee's note.
50. See. e.g.. Thom1011, 787 F.2d at 1154 (7th Cir. 1986) (attorney sanctioned in the a bsence
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T heir actions are now judged against those of the proverbial, but nonetheless ambiguous, " reasonable" attorney.
B.

Varied San ctions

Whenever a court find s that an attorney has violated rule 11, it
must impose an appropriate sancti on. 5 1 Although the rule mandates
sanctions, it gi ves courts consi derable discreti on in deter mining when
to sanction 5 2 and what type and amount of sanction to impose. 53 This
discretion adds a further element of uncertainty to rule 11 sanctions.
In addition to not knowing exactly what conduc t is sanctionable, individual attorneys are unable to anticipate the type or amount of sanctions a particular court might impose. 54
Rule 11 states that an appropriate sanction may include payment
of the reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees incur red by the agof " s ubj ec ti ve purpose to missta te law"); Al bri ght v. Upjo hn Co., 788 F .2d l 217 (6 th C ir. 1986)
(atto rn ey sa nc ti o ned in the absence o f a findin g of bad faith) ; East wa y Co nstr. Corp. v. C ity of
New Yo rk, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (sa me).
51. FED. R. C rv. P. II ("If a pleading, mo ti o n o r o ther pa per is signed in violatio n of this
rul e, th e co urt , upon a motion or upon its own initiative, sh all impos e ... an appro priate sanction. " ); see also Wesmwre!and, 770 F.2d at 1174 (" [T]he new provision that th e court 'shall
impose' sanctio ns ma nd a tes th e imposition of sanctio ns when wa rrant ed by gro undl ess o r abusive
prac tices.") ; Nelken, supra note 5, at 1321 ("[R]ule II mak es sa nction s mandat o ry." ). By m a ndating sanctions, the rule is "intend ed to redu ce th e relu cta nce of courts to impose sa nction s."
FED. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's no te.
52. Courts have imposed rule II sanctions o n attorneys, la w firms , a nd client s. See, e. g., Chu
v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985) (a ttorn ey sa nctioned); Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment
Group, 650 F. Supp . 684 (S.D .N.Y. 1986) (a tto rn ey and la w firm san c ti o ned ); Robin so n v. Nation al Cash R egister Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. l 987) (att o rn ey a nd cli ent sanctioned); Chevron, U.S.A. v. H a nd , 763 F.2d 11 84 (lOth Cir. 19 85) (cli ent sancti o ned). S ee generally Nelken ,
supra note 5, at 1329 (a 1985 survey of 100 rul e 11 cases found that att o rn eys were san c tioned in
38% of th e cases; clients in 29 % ; a nd both in 18 % ). Th e fa c t that a court can san c ti o n a client
rai ses the qu es ti o n of wh ether such san c ti ons are insurable under th e cli ent 's liability policies.
Althou gh thi s N o te is limited to the qu es tion of insuring a ttorn ey sa nction s, so me of th e analy sis
provid ed here may be a pplicable to sanctio ns aga inst c lients. Additi o na ll y, the a nal ys is co ntain ed in this Note would a pply to situations wh e re san c tioned client s sec k reco ve ry from th eir
atto rn eys. The question s present ed by these la tter situa tions in clude wh eth e r sa nction ed cli ents
ma y recove r from th eir a ttorn eys for malprac ti ce and, if so, whether th e attorneys ma y be ind e mnifi ed by their professio nal liabilit y insurers. A num be r of such indirec t cla ims for co verage of
rule 11 sanctions have apparentl y been made. Te lep ho ne int ervie w with Ja m es D. H adfi eld,
Counsel fo r Lawyers Mutual Insurance Co. (California) (Feb. 9, 1989). These in d irec t claims
rai se issues of in surability similar to those addressed in thi s N ote.
53. S ee, e. g., FED. R. Ci v . P. II ad viso ry committ ee's not e (Th e co urt "has discretion to
tail o r sa nctions to th e pa rti c ular facts of th e case.") ; Ins uran ce Benefit A dminrs. , Inc. v. Martin,
871 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1989) (district court ma y impose wid e range o f san c ti o ns); Eas tway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New Yo rk , 762 F.2d 243, 25 4 n. 7 (2d Cir. 198 5) ("(D]istrict courts
retain broad discreti on in fashioning sanctions . ... " ). Rul e II only requires that san c ti o ns be
"appropria te. " See, e.g., In re Yagman, 796 F. 2d 116 5, 1184- 85, opinion am ended, 803 F.2d
1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. C t. 4 50 ( 1987); Sc hwa rze r, S an ctions: A Closer Look,
supra note 5, a t 202-03 .
54. Cf Not e, supra not e 2, at 911-12 ("Judicial use of d ifferen t meth ods to cal c ul a te monetary sanctions is a
source of di sparit y, injecting an element of a rbitra rin ess int o Rul e 1 l
cases.") .
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grie ved party, 55 but this is by no means th e only sanction available.
Courts ha ve imposed a variety of nonmonetary sanction actions, including reprimanding attorneys, 56 striking pleadings or papers, 57
barring atto rneys from appearing in the court, 5 8 and referring attorney s to state disciplinary boards . 5 9 By far t he majo rity of cases, however, in vo lve m onetary sanctions.60 Even thou gh most courts assess
reasonab lr~ exper::;es an d attorneys' fees, the method of calcu latin g
these costs for rule 11 p urposes is imprecise. 6 1 Moreover, some courts
impose monetary sanctions that bear no relation to the expenses and
atto rneys' fees of the opposing p3.rty .62
55. F EIJ. R. Clv. P. 11: see also M iller & C ulp, Litig01ion Cosls. Delay Prompled Th e N ew
Rules of Civil Procedu re. Nat!. L.J., Nov. 28, 19 83, at 24, co l. I ("Th e new rules are intended to
m a ke a nyone who impro vide ntly si gns a document . .. bea r t he expenses incurred by the adve rsa ry in d ea lin g wit h it").
56. See, e.g . In re Curl, 803 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[T]h c publi c admonishment
of thi s opinion is sufficient sa nction.") ; Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 48 2 (3d Cir. Jn7)
("[C] o urts m ay sa nc tion by warnin g, o ra l repri ma nds in open court, or written admonition.''):
Schwarze r, SanCiions: A Closer Look, supra not e 5, at 201-02 (reprimand o r publis hed order as
san ctio n).
57. T he authority to strik e pleadin gs was exp licit in th e o ld rule ll , bu t is th eo retically sti ll
a va il ab le und er th e general la nguage o f "appropriate sanction" in th e amended rul e. See. e.g.,
Th omas v. Capital Sec. Se rvs., In c., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (en ban e) (" [D]is tri c t
courts may th eo retically still dismiss base less claims or defen ses as sanct io ns . . ."); Sc hw a rze r,
Sanelions: A Closer Look. supra not e 5, a t 204. This type of sanction , though, tend s to punish
th e cli ent for th e a ttorn ey's behavior.
58. See, e.g., Kendr ick v. Za ndid es, 609 F. Supp. 1162 , ! 173 (N.D. Ca l. 1985) (Schwarzer, J.)
(ord e ring attorn ey to show ca use wh y he should not be suspended from practicing in the No rthern Di strict of California) ; In re Curl, 803 F.2d at 1007 (di ctum) ("Th e cou rt will not hesitat e to
sanction futur e negligen ce with substantial mon eta ry fines, s uspension , o r disbarm ent from practi ce befo re our co urt.").
59. See. e.g., Lep ucki v. Van Worm er, 765 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir.) (refe rring attorney to state
disciplinary body for inv es ti gation), cerl. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).
60. G. JOSE PH , supra no te 26, at 225 ; S. KASS IN. supra no te 21, a t 40; Nnv YORK STATE
BAR ASSOCJ ,\TION COMM ITTEE ON FEDERAL COU RTS, supra not e 4, at 15, 23: R ULE ]] IN
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 36-3 9; Bloomenstein, Developing Slandards for !h e Imposilion of
San clions Under Rule I! of !he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 21 AKRON L. REv. 289, 291
n.ll ( 1988); Va iro , supra note 2, at 227.
6 1. See, e.g.. N EW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIAT ION CO MMiTTEE ON FED ERAL COURTS,
supra note 4, :1t 38-40: Le vin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in ;he Developing Law of Sa nclions. 36
Cc\TH . U. L REV . 587. 598-99 (19 87) .
62. See, e.g.. Na tion a l Ass n. o f Radiation Survivo rs v. Turnage, 115 F.R. D. 543, 559 ( N .D.
Ca l. 1987 ) (impos in g, in add iti o n to reaso nable expenses and fees of $ 105 ,000, a S 15,000 san c ti o n
pay ab le to th e cle rk of th e court "for the unn ecessa ry consumption of the court's time and resources"); Robin so n v. M oses, 644 F. Supp. 975, 98 2-83 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (imposing a $3600.00
sanct;on , pa yable to th e c lerk o f the court "for the waste of judicial reso urc es"); East way Cons tr.
Corp. v. C it y of N ew York, 821 F. 2d 121 (2d C ir. 19 87) (where reaso nable attorneys' fees
amounted to :550,000, court imposed sa nction of only $10,000); Doyle v. U nited States, 877 F.2d
1235 (5th Cir.) (whe re reaso nable att orneys' fe es amou nted to $1 ,554.8 8, co urt imposed sanction
of thi s amount in div iduall y on all twent y-fi ve plain tiffs) , cerr. denied, 1OS S. C t. 159 ( 1987):
Th o rnt on v. Wahl , 787 F.2 d 11 51 (7th Cir.) (i mpos in g sa nct io n of reaso nab le attorneys' fe es a nd
doubl e costs), cerl. denied, 479 U.S. 85 1 (19 86) . In additi o n, some co urts hav e adopted the
positi o n that. notwit hstandin g actual ex penses and fees, a sa nction shou ld be only as severe as
necessa ry to ac hi eve its purpose. See. e.g., Thom as v. Capital Sec . Scrvs. , Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878
(5 th Ci r. 19 88) (e n ban e): Ca bell v. Pett y, 8 10 F.2d 463, 466 (4t h Cir. 1987); Brown v. Federati o n
of Sta te Medical Bds., 830 F. 2d 142 9, 143 7 (7th C ir. 19 87).
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fl/fultiple Purposes

U ltimately what makes conduct sanctionable, and then v/hat
makes a particular sanct ion appropriate, depends on the purpose of
rule 11. 63 Do rule 11 sanctions serve the purpose of punishing or of
deterring violators of ru le 11? Or shouJd they compensate parties who
are for ced to respond to friv olous papers? As this section d-emon strates, courts and com menta tors have yet to agree on the proper
\Veight to be given th e ai nls of lJunishment, deterrence, and co rnp ens.2~ ·~
tion in deciding ru le 11 cases.
A ll three of these purposes are rooted in the concerns which led to
the amendment of the rule. I n the years leading up to the 1983
amendments, the bench and bar had become increasingly concerned
with a litigation explosion in general and with abuse of the litigation
process in particular. 64 Professor Arthur M iller, the reporter for the
Federal R ules Advisory Committee that drafted the 198 3 amend ments, described the concerns about litiga tion abuse as follo ws :
There is a widespread feeling that there is a lot of fri volous conduct on
the part of lawyers out there, a lot of vexatious cond uct, a lot of ineffi cient conduct. . . . F rivolous motions are made and there is frivolous or
vexatious discovery. I repeat, we do not know how much of this there
really is, because what one person would call frivolous, somebody else
would call meaningful or substantive .. .. We really don't know, but th e
advisory committee - composed of your colleagues on the district
courts, a couple of court of appeals judges, an d some distinguished trial
lawyers from around the country - felt that th ere had to be some meaningful restraint put on lawyer behavior to cut out some of this type of
conduct. 65

The advisory committee sought restraint on lawyer behavior to make
the judicial process more efficient. Former ru le 11, however, had "not
been effective in deterring abuses" 66 because it covered only those in··
stances where attorneys intentionally filed frivolous pleadings and included only a limited range of sanctioning mechanisms. 67
T he new rule aims at red ucing "the reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions," thereby d iscouraging "dilatory or abusive tactics" and
helping " to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous
claims or defenses." 68 Most courts and commentators a gree that
63. See Th omas, 836 F.2d at 878; G. JosEPH, supra note 26, a t 30-31 ; T. WJLLGl NG, supra
note 3, at 25.
64. See, e.g., Address by C hief Ju stice W arren Burger, National Co nference on th e Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with th e Ad ministration of Ju sti ce (April 7, 1976), reprinled in 70
F .R.D . 79, 91 (1976) ("' Cor rec t or not, there is also a widespread feelin g that the legal profess io n
a nd judges are overly to leran t of lawyers who exploit th e inh erently co ntentious aspects of th e
adversa ry system to their own private adva ntage at public expe nse.").
65. A. MILLER, supra note 30, a t 11-1 2.
66. FED. R. Crv. P. ! I ad viso ry committee's note.
67. See supra notes 14-1 8 a nd acco mpan yin g tex t.
68. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 ad viso ry com mittee 's not e.
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amended rule ll is generally designed to deter attorneys from filing
frivoious and vexatious papers. 69 Yet by itself, the goal of deterrence
offers little guidance to judges d ecidir;g ru le 11 cases.70 As one commentator has noted:
Th e undifferentiated desires to " di scou rage dilatory o r ab usive tactics
a nd help to st ream iine the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims
or defenses," ... are little more than state·ments of ide2ls o r exhortations
to d ecency and right conduct. T hey are no t di sput able. N or are they
terribly helpful to a judge fac ed with the guestioD whet her or how to
sa nction specific behavior. 71

Deterrence as an underlyin g policy is not a particularly helpful guide
in determining what type of sanction a court should im pose because
any type of sanction will have some d eterrent effect. Indeed, using
sanctions to achieve either of the other purposes generally attributed
to rule 11, namely compensation or pun ishmen t, will invariably have
the additional consequence of deterring some frivolous behavior. 72
Courts and commentators disagree about whether and to what extent the rule should serve the independent purposes of compensation
or punishment. 73 Professor Miller, for example, has argued that rule
11 sanctions should serve compensatory goals: "Although denominated a sanction provision, in reality [sanctions are] more appropriately characterized as a cost-shifting technique." 74 As one judge has
69. On the views of courts, see. e.g.. Szabo Food Serv ., Inc. v. Canteen Corp ., 823 F.2d 1073,
1077 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Ru le II is des ig ned to di scourage unnecessary co mplaints and ot her filings." ), ce rt. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 ("[T]he
primary pu rpose of sanc tio ns ... is to deter subseq ue nt abuses."), opinion amended, 803 F.2d
1085 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 10 8 S. Ct. 450 (1987); Westmoreland v . CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d
1168, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("Rule II is specifi cal ly des igned to deter gro undless litigation tactics a nd stem needless liti gation costs to courts and counsel."); S. KASS IN, supra note 21, at 29-32
(59.4% of t he 296 fede ral judges su rveyed believed th at deterrence is th e most important purpose
of rule 11 sanctions, compared with 21 o/o and ! 9.6 % who favored rationales of compensation
and punishment, res pectively); T. W tLLGING, supra note 3, at 22-23 (O ut of 17 judges surveyed ,
71 % said det er rence was their primary purpose in im posing sanctions; 18% sa id compensation;
and 6% said punishment.); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 2, at 1020 (The "vast majority of courts agree that the rule's purpose is to deter <~buse.") . On the views of co mm entato rs,
see, e.g.. T. WtLLGING , supra note 3, a t 20-2! (Commentators a sse rt that "dete rrenc e of abuses"
is the primary pu rpose of sa ncti o ns. ); Ne lk en, supra note 5. at 13!7, !352 (Rule ll is aimed at
"deterring frivolous fi lin gs. "); Parness, supra note 5, a t 19 38 (Deterre nce is an objective of rule
i 1.); Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited. supra note 2, at 1020 n.3l (Commentators agree that deterren ce is the "overriding purpose" of sanctions.) .
70. Indeed, even where federal judges ag ree that deterrence is a primary goa l of rule ll, on e
study showed that "all of the judges had addition a l purposes in mind." T. WILLGING, supra note
3. at 24.
71. G. JosEPH, supra no te 26, at 28 (footn o tes omitted).
72. See, e.g. , T. WILLGING, supra note 3. at 26 -31 ; Ne lken, supra note 5, a t 1325 ; Schwarzer,
Rule 11 Revisiled, supra note 2, at 1020 n.31.
73. In a survey of approximately 300 federal judges, for examp le, 21% of th e judges vie wed
compensation as the primary purpose of rule l i , and 19.6 % viewed punishment as the prima ry
purpose. The remainder thought th e primary purpose was deterre nce. S. KASSIN, supra note 21,
at 29. On the tension between compensatio n and punishm e nt in rule 11 doc trine generally, see
Nelken. supra note 5, at 1323-24.
74. Mi ller & Culp, supra no te 55, at 34.
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observed, "[r]ule 11 sanctions are not ... meant solely to dete r those
who would abuse our feder al system of j ustice: they serve also to com pensate the victims of that ab use." 7 5 In on:.; case, rule 11 was fla t ly
described as a " fee-shifti ng st atute. " 76
Other courts and commen tato rs, however, suggest that rule 11
sho ul d ser ve prima rily the purpose of p unis h rn'=nt. 77 R ule 11 sanctions, accordi ng to one court, ~'a re not i nt e n :.-1 ;~ :=! tc rnake tJ1e moving
party \vh ole' for any and ali damages he or she UHl Y have sustained by
virtue of the malicious prosecution of :a. rnerit k ss r::L:.im.' ' 78 Sanctions
should be "aimed at deterring and , if necessaxy, punishing im proper
conduct rat her than merely com pensati ng the prevailing party." 79
The lan guage of rule 11 and the notes of th e advisory committee
do no t resolve t his issue. The amended rule elimin ates subjective stand ards for determining violation s of the rule an d emp hasizes compen satory fee-shifting as an appropriate sanction. t\o In giving judges broad
discretion to determine appropriate sanctions, however, the amendments leave considerable room for punitive goals. Furthermore, the
advisory committee notes speak in terms of punishing violators of the
rule 8 1 and in struct courts to consider subjecti ve bad faith in determining the "nature and severity" of sanctions.8 2
Judging from the language of rule 11, the advisory committee
notes, the case law, and the academic commenta ry , a useful , guiding
purpose of rule 11 sanctions is far from evident. As this section of the
Note has discussed, rule 11 sanctions serve the multiple purposes of
p unishment, deterrence, and compen sation . ~n Judges and lawyers a re
75. Eastwa y Constr. Corp. v. City of Ne w Yor k, 821 F. 2d 12!. 125 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J. ,
di sse nting); see also In re TCI Ltd., 769 F .2d 441, 446 (7th C ir 198 5) (best way to dete r frivol ous
pl ead in g "is to ensure th at those who crea te costs also bea r them"); Pe rki nson v. H o ulihan 's!
D. C. , In c. , !08 F. R.D. 667 , 676 (D.D.C. 198 5) ("T he Federal R ul es require that sa nc tion s be
desi gned so as to co mpensate the wron ged part y fo r th e ex tra effo ri it was forc ed to expend
because of the wro ngdoer's obstructive beha vior.").
76. H ays v. Sony Co rp. of Am ., 847 F.2d 412 , 4 19 (7 th C r. 1988).
77. See. e. g., O li veri v. Thompso n, 803 F. 2d 1265 , i 28 I (2 d C ir. i 986) (noting th a t the primary pur pose of sa nctions is "to punish de viati ons from pro per sta ndard s of condu ct") , cen
d en ied, 480 U.S. 9 18 (19 87); Westm o relan d v. C BS, in c., 770 F .2d 1168, 11 80 (D. C. C ir. 198 5)
(no ting tha t rui e 11 sancti o ns serve a "dual purpose " of puni shm ent and deterren ce).
78. Chris & T odd, Inc. v. Arkansas D ept. of Finance & Admin. , 125 F.R.D. 49 1, 49 3-94
(E. D. Ark . 1989); see also G aiardo v. Eth yl Corp. , 835 F. 2d 479, 483 (3d C ir. 1987 ) (Sanct io ns
"should no t be vi ewed as a general fee-shifting device." ); R ULE 11 IN T RAN S ITION , sup ra note 2,
a t 37, 40 (arguin g ag ain st the compensat ory purpose of rul e 11); Vairo, supra note 2, at 232- 33
(sa me).
79. Sc hwarzer, S anctions: A Closer L ook, sup ra note 5, a t 185 .
80. S ee supra no tes 21 , 55 and accompa nyin g text.
8 1. F ED. R. Cl v . P. 11 adviso ry com m ittee 's no <e ("Th e det ect io n a nd pu nishm en t of a vio lati on of th e signin g requirement, enco uraged by th e amended rule, is pa rt of the court' s respo nsibility fo r sec urin g th e sys tem's effective o pe rati o n.' ') (emph as is ad ded) .
82. f ED. R. Cl v. P. II advi so ry com m ittee's no te.
83. S ee. e.g.. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Se rv s., inc ., 836 F. 2d 866, 877 (5th C ir. 1988 ) (en ba ne);
G aiard o v. E th yl Co rp. , 835 F.2d 479 , 482-83 (3d C ir. 1987); L ieb v. Tops to nc Indus., In c , 788
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unsure w hic h of these three purposes is the overriding purpose of rule
11 , ~mel this confusion has onl y exacerbated the uncertain ty created by
th:: r ule' s broad standards and varied sanctions. 84

H.

i \ TTORNEY PR OF ESSIONAL LIA BILiTY INSURANCE AN D
RULE 11 SANCT!ONS

The confusion o ve r ru le 11 leaves attorneys fac ing a considerable
.ri:1'k.
:~Ltto rn ey s ~ 1ike mos t people, are risk averse, 05 th ey will seek
insu ran ce to pro tect them selves from th e risk of rule 11 sanctions. At to rn ey:; will li kely loo k first for coverage under their existing professio:nl liability policies.8 6 Attorney professional liabil it y insurance
covers che risk of loss arising in the co urse o f rendering legal services 3 7 Does it also cover the risk of rule 11 sanctions? I n ad dressing
th is quest ion, th is Part applies various doctrines of insurance interpretat ion to the lang uage found in most attorney professional liability policies. T h e analysis in this section is based on the Insurance Services
O ffi ce lawye rs ' professional liability policy form, as well as on a rev iew
of policies obtained from twenty attorney professional liabi lity insurers
nationwide. 88 Although not all attorney professional liability policies
F.2 d 151, 15 8 (3d Cir. 19 86); Parness, supra note 5, at 1938 ; Note, supra note 2, at 907-09.
Havin g multipl e purposes is not unusual for a legal doctrin e. Much o f tort law, for example, has
hybrid p urposes . Compensation of the victim is a main purpose of tort liabi lit y, but suc h li ab ilit y
a lso accompli shes purposes of d eterrence and punishment. See. e.g.. Litan, Swire & Winston,
The US. Liability System: Background and Trends, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLI CY
3-5 (19 88).
84 . Sec. e.g., G. JosEPH, supra note 26, at 31 ("Lack of clarity over goa ls .. . enhance[s] th e
confusi o n gen erated by un ce rtain st andards and uneven enforcement. " ); Vairo, supra note 2, at
203 ('"Confu sion ove r which one of these purposes is the primary purpose (of rul e 11 sanct ions]
has led to in co nsistent resu lts in th e cases .").
85. See. e.g., W. LA ND ES & R. PosNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTUR E OF TORT LAW 56-57
( 19 87) (m ost peo pl e are ris k averse); A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCT ION TO L\ W Ai'o' D ECONOMICS 51 (1983) (sa m e); F. STEPHEN , THE ECONOM ICS OF THE LAW 144 (1988) (sa me) .
86 . In 1-act. there is some evid ence indicatin g that attorneys have already beg un to look fo r
cov erage from t heir professio nal liability insurers. See supra note 7.
87. 5.."cc 7;-\ J. APPLEMAN , INSU RANC E LAW & PRACTICE§ 4504.01, at 309-10 (1979) F o r
othe r types o l-l osses, a ttorn eys mu st look to o ther form s of in surance, e.g.. propert y insura nce for
loss or damage to records, pa pers, or ot her property. o r director's and offi cer· s insu ra nce for
lawyers who serve in su ch co rpora te positions. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPR ,\CTIC E
§ 725 (2d ed. 1981 ). The discussion in this Note is limit ed to professi onal liability in suran ce
s ince attorneys incur rule 11 sanctio ns wh ile rendering profess iona l legal se rvi ces.
88. Poiicies were solicited fr om forty-one in suran ce companies offering attorney profession a l
liabilit y insurance. T he policies reviewed for this Part were thos e received in response to th at
solicitation from th e fo llowing co mpanies: American Home Assurance Co. ; Assoc iati on of Trial
Lawyers A ssurance; The Bar Plan (Missouri); Cont in en tal Casualty Co. (CNA) (offering policies
through loca l underwriters in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Tenn essee); Evanston
.Insurance C o.; The Home Insurance Co.; Insura nce Co., Ltd. ; Internation a l Surplus Lin es ln s ur·
ance Co.; Lawyers ' Mutual Insurance Co. (Californi a); Lawyers Mutual In suran ce Co. of K enlUcky ; Lawyers Mutual Liabilit y In s ura nce Co. of No rth Carolina; Michigan Lawyers Mutual
Insurance Co .; New E ngland Insurance Co . (Massachusetts and Rh ode Isl an d); Ohio Bar Liabil·
it y In s urance Co. ; Orego n Sta te Bar Professional Liability Fund; Rumger In suran ce Co. ; St. Paul
F 1re & M arin e Insura nce Co.; T exas L a wyers ' In s uran ce Exc hange; The Virgini a Insurance R e·
c iproca l; a nd Wiscon sin La wyers Mutual In surance Co. A total of twenty -fi ve policies w ere
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are identical, sY most follow the same general form.9° Much of the language is si1ni lar enough to discuss the policies as a gro up, although
variations a re noted below vvhere relevan t.
Under m ost attorney professional liability poiicies, insurers agree
to indemnify policyholders for all sums which they becom e legally obligated to pay as " damages" for acts, errors, or omissions arising out
of the perfo rrn a:nce of profess ional legal services.91 Insurers also agree
to defend a ny claims instituted against insured att orneys >,vhich may
result in avvards for such damages, even if the claims are groundless,
fraudulent, or fa1se. 92 Most poiicies, however, excl ude coverage for
losses that a re outside the scope of the insured's capacities as an attorney93 or tha t are difficult or against public policy to insure. 94
In interpreting attorney professional liability policies, courts use
the same d octrines of construction used to interpret other types of insurance policies.95 M ost courts interpret insurance policies according
to the plain meaning of the policy wording. 96 When ambiguities arise,
however, courts generally construe the la nguage against the in surer
exa mined ; the large r number of poli cies is due to th e fact that some companies offered m ore than
on e policy. Co pi es of these policies are on file with the Michigan Law Review. F o r examp les of
language found in th ese polic ies, see infra notes 109, 111 , 120, 129, 134, 136-139, 142, 145-46,
and text acc om pany in g note i 31.
89. In fac t , there are two d ifferent types of attorney professional liabilit y policies - " occ urren ce" and "claims m ade" -but the distin ction between these two types of policies is not relevant here. The basic d ifference be tween the tw o policies lies in when and how coverage is
tri gge red . Coverage und er the occurre nce poli cy is triggered by an ac t or o missio n occurring
during th e poli cy period whi ch ultim ately gives rise to a claim against the attorn ey . Coverage
under the claims mad e policy is triggered by the filing of a cl aim within the policy period, rega rdless of when th e ac t or om issio n giving ri se to the claim occurred. See generally J. F ELIX, A
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO LEGAl. MALPRACT ICE INSURANC E, 13-16 (1982); R. MALLEN & V.
LEV JT, supra note 87, §§ 709-10. Th e difference in when coverage is triggered does not affect th e
issu e of whether ru le 11 sa ncti ons are cov.:red by attorn ey profess ional liabili ty poli c ies. Resolution o f this b roader issu e hinges on matters discussed in this Pa rt, such as th e definition of damages and the sc ope of exc lu sions. See infra not es 109-44 and accompanying text. This Note,
therefore, does not d isting ui sh betw een occurrence and claims made po lici es.
90. The In sura nce Ser vir;es Office, for examp le, prepares stan da rd li abi lity po li cy fo rm s
which m any insu ra nc e companies follow. See gen erally E. V AUGHAN, F UNDAM ENTALS OF RISK
AND lNSURA i'iCE 8 3 (3d ed . !982).
9 1. See gen erally J. F ELI X, supra note 89, at 17; R . MALL EN & V. L EVIT, supm note il7 ,

§ 705. For examples of typica l policy lan g uage, see infra note 109.
92. See gen erally R. MALLEN & V. L EVIT, supra note 87, § 71 6. For ex am ples of ty pical
policy language , see infra not e 145.
93. For example, exc lusions oft en rem ove coverage fo r prope rty damage or for liabilit y arising out of an att orney' s service as a corpo rate director o r office r. See generally R . MA LL EN & V.
LEVIT, supra noie 87, § 7 i 7 .
94. For example, most policies exc lud e co verage for intention al criminal acts. See generally
J. FELIX, supra note 89, a t 2 1; R . MA LLE N & V. LEVIT, supra no te 87, § 718. Policy exclusions
are discu ssed infra at notes I 19-44 an d acco mpanying tex t.
95 . SeeR. MALLE N & V. LE VIT, supra not e 87, § 701.
96. See, e.g., Go uch er v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 113 R.I. 672, 679, 324 A.2d 657 ,
661 (1974) (language in insurance policy "must be give n its plain , o rdin a ry , and usua l m ea ning");
In surance Co . of N . Am. v. Adk isso n, 121 Ill. App. 3d 224, 229 , 459 N.E.2d 310, 3 14 (App. Ct.
19 84) (in suran ce po li c ies should be interpreted lik e any ot her contract); Stan da rd Venetian Blind
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and in favor of the insured .97 Courts interpr et words of inclusion
broad ly, and words of exclusion nmTov>' ly .98 This doctrine, sometimes
called contra proferentem. 99 is justiiled en the grounds t hat insurers
generally draft standard insurance policie:: and that policyho lders have
little choice but to accept t he languag"· as it was drafted. 100
Some courts tak~e a s om e~;vhat different a}Jproach) interpretir1g po11cy 1Ztnguage according to th.:; rca:.;o ti ~~}J 1f:' expectatio_ns of tl1e in ~
sured. 101 H the ord inary policyholder Cl~ uld reasonably expect
cover age under the policy, courts ir' L·,eny :_,,tc,_(es will find coverage
regardless of the actual language in th e poEcy . 102 The reasonable ezpectations doctrine h as led som e co urts to fin d coverage even though
t he policy language unambiguo usly ·exciuded it. 103 Other courts have
used reasonable expectations in a mor-e limited way to resolve ambiguities in policy wording. 10 4 Although courts generally invoke the expectations doctrine only in cases ·where the policyh old ers ar e ordina ry
C o. v. Am erican Empire In s. Co., 50 3 Fa. 300, 469 A .2-:l 563 ( 1983 ) (same); R. MALLEN & V.
L EVIT, supra note 87, § 70 !.
97. See, e.g.. Liverpoo l & London & G lobe In s. C o. v. Kearney, 180 U .S. 132, 135-36 (190 1)
(" [A] po lic y [which) is so fra m ed as to leav e room for two co nst ruct io ns ... should be inte rpreted most stro ngl y against the in sure r." ); Sincoffv. Libert y M ut. F ire Ins. Co. , 11 N.Y .2d 386,
390, 18 3 N.E.2d 899, 901 -02,230 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 ( 19 62 ) (ambi g uo us la ngu age should be strictl y
construed again st the in sure r); 7 S. W ILLJSTON, A T RE.";riSE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 900 (3 d ed. 195 7) ("A mbiguo us lan g uage in a po licy o f insura nce is to be const r ued liberal ly in
favor of th e insured a nd strict ly again st th e in sure r." ).
98 . R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 87, § 701.
99 . Contra proferentem li te ra lly means " (a]ga inst the party who proffers o r puts forwa rd a
th in g." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (5 t h ed. 19 79) .
100. See, e.g., Gaunt v. J o hn H an cock Mut. Life Ins . Co ., 160 F. 2d 599, 602 (2d C ir. ) (Ha nd,
J .) (" [I] ns ure rs w ho see k to impose u po n words of common s peec h a n esote ri c sig nifican ce int ell i·
g ible o nl y to their craft, must bea r the b urden o f any resuiting co nfu sion.") , cerl. denied, 331 U.S.
849 ( 1947); Sparks v. St. Paul In s. Co., 100 N .J. 32 5, 326, 49 5 A .2d 406, 407 (1985) (Courts
resolve a mb ig uiti es again st ins urers because ins uran ce "co ntracts are hi ghl y techn ica l, ex tre m ely
d iffic ult to und ers tand , and not subject to bargaining o ver th e term s."); Mathews v. A m erican
C ent. Ins. Co., 154 N.Y . 449, 4 56-5 7, 48 N.E. 751 , 752 ( i 897) (S in ce in surers draft policies wit h
their ow n inte rests in mind, "w hen th e m e<: ning is doub tful , (a policy] shou ld be cons tru ed m os t
favo rable to the in s ured, wh o had noth in g to do with the pre pa ra ti o n th e reof. " ). The doc tri ne of
const ruing a mbiguous language again st the insurer applies in <>.ttorn ey professional liability cases,
even thoug h a tt o rneys m ight be thoug h t to be m o re know led geab le a bo ut in surance than ord inary co ns um e rs.
10!. K. ABRA HAM, D IST RIB UT ING R!S K: INSU R AN CE, L EGAL TH EORY , AN D P UBLIC P o LICY 235 n.6 (1 9 86) (finding over a hundred cases in vo lving the reaso nable ex pec tations doctrine) ;
R. K EETON & A. WIDISS, I NSURANCE LAW§ 6. 3, a t 633 ( 1988) (c ourts p rotec tin g th e reasona bl e expectat ion s of t he insured).
102. K . ABRA HAM, supra note !0!, a t 102 .
103. See, e.g.. Steven v. Fi d elity & Casualt y Co., 58 CaL 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Ca L Rp tr.
172 (!962) (reasonab le exp ecta tion s dictated covera ge for dea th on a chartered fl ight d es pit e air
t ra vel in s ur a nc e poli cy's provision of covei·age only for t ranspo rtation o n a "Sched ul ed Air Carrier" o r a la nd ca rrie r provided by the sc hed uled a ir C3.rrier in th e even t of an interrupt io n of
service) ; C & J Fe rtilizer, I nc. v. A lli ed Mut. In s. C o , 227 N .W .2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (reasonabl e
expectations dictated cove rage for a bu rglary despite po li cy language requiring that th e exterior
of th e p re mi ses show signs of forced e ntry).
10-'\. See, e.g. . Evench ik v. St ate F arm ln s. C o ., ! 39 Ariz. 45 3, 67 9 P.2d 99 (A riz. C t. A pp.
19 84) .
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consumers, 105 the doctrine has also been used by courts to find coverage in cases where the policyholders 'Nere attorneys . 106
Both the doctrines of contra proferentem and reasonable expectations provide coGrts with flexibility in determining whether existing
attorney professional iiability policies cover rule 11 sanctions. As one
com mentator observes, however, "[s]ometimes the -:::Jurts . . . seem to
search for ambiguities in an insurance policy where Done ex ist ... .
The consequence is that judicial tech niq ues of interpretation frequently create insurance coverage when policies do not provide for
it." 107 Although many courts do not actively seek to create ambiguities or redraft policies, 108 some may well use the doctrines of interpretation to fi nd coverage for rule 11 sanctions.
In evaluating '<Vhether existing policies provide coverage for sanctions, courts need to consider first whether sanctions are "damages" as
covered by the policies, and second, whether sanctions fall within any
of the policies' exclusions. I n addition, courts need to determine
whether insurers must defend their insured attorneys against rule 11
motions. The following sections apply the doctrines outlined above to
language commonly found in attorney professional liability insurance
policies. As discussed below, courts may find that existing policies are
ambiguous with respect to rule 11 and may use the doctrines of contra
proferentem or reasonable expectations to find coverage for rule 11
sanctions.
A.

Are Sanctions "Damages"?

For attorney professional liability poiicies to cover rule 11 sanctions, these sanctions must be considered "damages'' that arise out of
an act or omission of a lawyer which occurs in the course of rendering
professional services as an attorney. i 09 Rule 11 sanctions plai nl y arise
105. See, e.g. Spaid v. C al- Western States Life Ins. Co., l30 Cal. A pp. 3d 803, 182 CaL Rp tr.
3 ( !982); Commercial Unio n Assurance v. Go!lan , 11 8 N .H. 744, 394 A .2d 8~ 9 (197 8); K ievit v.
Loyal Protec tion Life In s. C o .. 34 N.J . 475, 170 A .2d 22 ( 19fi l); K. A BRAH ,\?\1. supra not e 101,
at 103.
106. See. e.g, Gyler v. Mi ssi on Ins. Co ., 10 Cal. 3d216, 514 P .2d i219, 110 CaL Rptr. 139
( 1973) (find ing cove rage under a claims made attorney professional liability poli cy for a c laim
filed after the expiration of the policy); Sparks v. S1. Pau l Ins. Co., 100 N. J . 325, 495 A .2d 406
( 19 85) (same).
107. K. ABR AH AM. supra not e 101, at 101; see also Tra nsam erica Ins. G roup v. Meere, 143
A riz. 351,355,694 P.2d 181, 185 (1984) (disapprov ingly not ing th at cour ts " find. o r fa il to fi nd,
amb iguity in order to ju stify an almost predetermined result"').
108. See, e.g., F irst N a t!. Bank v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 428 F.2d 499 (7th Ci r. 1970)
( R easonable expectations sho uld not control express term s of a policy.), cerr. denied, 40 1 U.S.
912 (1971); Jenkin s v. State Security Ins. Co., 56 IlL App. 3d 737, 742, 371 N.E.2d 1203, 1206
( 1978) ("[T]he ruie that a mbiguou s provisions are to be st rictly co nstru ed against the ins urer
does not permit perversion of plain lan guage to create ambiguity where no ne ex ists.") .
109. The typi ca l attorney profess ional liability policy ind emnifi es only su ms th at a n attorn ey
is obligated to pay "as damages." The rel eva nt section of the Insurance Services Office form , for
~xa mpk , reads as follows:
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ou t of acts or omissions tha t occur while an attorney is ren d ering legal
services: the at torn ey acts b y signing a paper an d filin g it wit h the
court in violation of the r ule; or she o m its to act by failing to make a
reasonable inquiry in to the fact s and law u nderlyi ng the pa per's asserti ons. 1 ;o The more d iffi cul t question is w hether rule 11 sanctions const itute "da mages" as covered b y the po licies.
Because many policies do not define th·e i,vord ~ 'd arnages, ~" 1 1 1
ri~so 1,vin g thi5 qtv:stion rnay hinge on the piain IY1e2.ning of the terrn . 1 12
In one 3-: nse of the -;,vord, damages coul d rnean compensation fo r loss
or harm inc urred by a n inju red t hird party. 1 i 3 The im posi tion of ru le
11 san ctions, ho >.v ever, does not de pend on injury to a noth er pa rty, but
rat her on a vio lation of the ruie. 11 4 A lthough in theory courts need
not calcul ate sanctions on the bas is of injury to the other party , pract icall y speaking m ost courts do base t he amount of rule 11 sa nct ions o n
th e ot her party' s costs and a tto rn eys' fees . l 15 Therefor e, m ost ru le 11
sanctions are clearl y " damages" under a com pensatory meaning of the
term . i I ~>
Th e co m pan y will pay o n be half o f th e in sured a ll s um s w hich t he in s u red sha ll becom e
leg:1 ll y ob li ga ted to pa y as da mages beca use o f a ny ac t or om issi o n of th e ins ured, or o f a ny
o ther pe rso n for whose ac t o r omission th e insured is leg ally respons ible whi c h oc c urs durin g th e po!icy per io d. and a rises o ut o f th e performa nce of professio na l se rvices fo r ot h e rs in
th e in su red "s profess io n as a lawye r.
lN SU FL\N CE SERVI CES OF f iCE, N o. G L- 00-23, LAWYERS P ROF ESSIONAL L IAIJILITY FOR!'.t
(Ma r. 1981) (c urre nt fo rm ). F o r a so m ewh a t broad e r wordin g, see C NA , N o. G-42072-D , L \ WYERS PR OFESS IONAL L IA BILITY COVE RAG E a rt. l , §A . (Sept. 1985) (" W e will pa y a l! a m o unt s,
up to our limit of liability, which yo u becom e legally o bligated to pay as a result o f a w ro ngful ac t
by yo u or by a n y en tity for whom yo u are legally li a ble.").
110. Cj." Ha ys v. So n y C o rp. of A m. , 847 F.2d 412, 41 8 ( 7th Cir. 1988) ('" Rul e II d efin es a
ne w form of legal m a lpracti ce.").
l i 1. T he indu st ry mod el fo rm fo r a tto rney profess io nal li a bility in sura nce, fo r exa mp le, co ntall1 s d efi n iti o ns for "'cla im s ex pen ses," "'suit ," and ""bodil y injury," but no definiti o n fo r '" d a mages." S ee INSURAN CE S ERVICES O FFICE, N o . GL-00-23, LAWYERS P ROFESS IONAL L IMliLITY
F ORI-1 (M a r. 198 1). T hose po li c ies th a t d o co ntain a d efiniti o n o f '"d a mages·· defin e th e te rm as
··:1n awar d o r se ttl e m ent fo r mo ney ." See, e.g. , TH E BA R PLAN, No. TB P- 2, L A WYERS PRO FES SI O~L\L Li . \tl lLITY I NS UR ..\ NCE PoLI CY 13 (h n. 19 89) . Some insurers a ttempt to defin e th e te rm
by say ing wha t ar~ not co nside red ' "da m ages. " Th ese la tt er ins tan ces a re treated as exc lu sio ns
for th e pu r pose of thi s Note a nd :1 re di sc ussed in th e next sect ion .
l 12. S ue supra no te 96 a nd acco mpan yin g text.
11 3. Sue. e.g.. M iller v. We lle r, 288 F .2d 438 , 4 39 (3d C ir. 196!) (Damages m eans " some thll1g pa id in recompe nse fo r a n in fri ngem ent o f a pl aint iff 's lega l r ight by the defend a nt"s li ab ility -creatin g condu c t.""); Fra nkel v. United States, 32 1 F. Supp. !3 3 1, 1347 (E.D Pa. 1970)
('"Dam ages n1 ea ns co mpensa ti o n fo r a legal injury sustain ed."): York v . O rego n Sta te Correc t ions In st. , 59 O r. f\p p. 70 8,7 11, 65 1 P.2d 1376, 1378 (198 2) ("" D amage is pec uniary co m pe nsa ti o n reco ve rable for injury o r loss s uffered thro ugh th e unlawful act , o missi o n, or neg li gence of
a noth er." ): F ull er v. Direc to r o f F in a nce, 694 P.2d 1045, 1048 (U ta h 1985) ('"T he o rdin ary
m eani ng of d a mages in c lud es co mpensa ti o n ."); cf Pe rl v. St. Pa ul F ire & Ma rin e I ns. CD .. 34 5
N .W .2d 209, 212 (M inn. 198 4) (compe nsat o ry definiti o n of da mages unsucc essfully ad va nced by
at torney profess io na l li a bilit y insure r); Na ti on wid e M utual Ins urance C o . v. K ni g h t, 34 N.C.
App. 96, I 00. 237 S. E. 2d 34 1, 345 ( 1977 ) ("'Th e com mo nl y <Jccep ted d efi niti o n of th e t e ~ m "d a ma ges docs no t in,:Ju de puniti ve dam ages.").
114 . Se<' supra no te 51 a nd accom pan yin g te xt.
l! 5. Va im , supra no te 2, at 227.
116. S eu H a milt o n, McKee, & Le vitt. sup ra note 7, at 525 ('"T he com pensa tory p urpose of
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The term "damages" in attorney professional liability policies,
though, does not ah-vays mean compensatory damages. In Peri v. St.
Paul Fire & J'),ftu·ine Insurance Co., 117 for example, the M innesota
Supreme Court interp reted " damages" much more broadly in deterrnining whether a fee forfeiture for an attorney's breach of fiduciary
duty was covered under an attorney professional liability policy.
A lthotlgh tl-H~ c ot.l:C~ 1irnited co\,erage 011 other gro u:n.cls~ it ncjneti1e!ess
held that a fe:e LHf;-::iture was "damages" within the m eaning of the
attorney's policy, Th':: coun foun d that damages "refers to all money
damages whether or no~c awarded to compensate for actual harm ." 118
Under this definit ion of damages, monetary rule 11 sanctions would be
considered darnages covered by insurance policies regardless of the
purpose behind their imposition .
Since attorney professional liability policies do not adequately defin e the term " damages," courts may well find t he term ambiguous
and, like the Perl court, interpret it broadly. If insurers had wanted
the term "damages" to take on a particular meaning that would either
not include rule 11 sanctions, or not include rule 11 sanctions that are
not compensatory, they could have so defined the term in the policy.
B . Are Sanctions Excluded?

Although rule 11 sanctions m·ay fall within the meaning of the
term "damages," they still could fall outside the policy coverage because of exclusion provisions. 119 Three common exclusions may eliminate coverage for rule 11 sanctions. These are the exclusions for "fines
or penalties," "punitive or exemplary damages," and "dishonest,
fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts or omissions" of the insured.
This section discusses the applicability of these exclusions to rule 11
insurance and concludes that, under the terms of some policies, these
exclusions may not prevent a court from allowing coverage for rule 11
sanctions .
Attorney professional iiability policies usually exclude coverage for
"fines or pena.Ities," 120 but the policies do not expressly state 1Nhat
constitutes a fine or a penalty . Thus, deciding whether rule 11 sanctions are fines or penalties may depend partly on one's view of the
purpose of sanctions. If sanctions are viewed as punishment and not
as compensation, then they seem more like fines or penalties than they
fee awards , , , renders them more in the nature of the type of 'damages' normally cov ered under
profess ional iiab ility pol icies,")_

117_ 345 N_W_2 d 209 (Mi nn. 1984) .
118_ 345 N \V,2d <1 t 2 12,
119, See supra not e;; 93 -94 and accompanying texL
!20, See. e,g .. Ho:viE lNSU RAN CE CO MPANY, No_ H35175-F,

LAWYERS PROFESS!Gr,AL LIA -

BILITY lNSURA ~CE POLI CY § B.L(b,3) (SepL 1983) (po lic y coverage "does not include fin es o r

stat ut o ry penalties , , , whet her imposed by law or otherw ise") ,
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do vvhen viewed as compensation. 12 1
In the rule 11 context, some cou rts a nd co m mentators have distinguished between compensatory sanctions ;::md fines or penalties. One
judge, for exam ple, ca utioned th a t "courts r:eed t o be wary about im1
. nnes
"
}, ru 1e , anal urgeo' t h.at "''Ltl1ne
~
•
posmg
m1d er t1.e
S<Ler
course ... 1s
to
122
limit sanctions to con sequ ential expe:r1ses &. ll d a tto rney's fees."
Another j u''ge refe rred to a sar>.ction '\rnrelu<
:;:;d to any such objective
r·
r•
ngure
as ex penses or a n acLorney s 1ee
as ,;., a p ·~n a ; ~ y m
i..oe nature o f a
fme ." 123 In &ddition, the l\ii nth C ir cuit Co'J.rt af l \upeals, in reversin g
a $250,000 san ction, n o ted t hat "a monetary s.s.nction [may] assume
the criminal character of a fine ... if the a mount of the sanction imposed is grossly disproportionate to th 2.ttorm:y's misconduct or
otherwise falls outside the: bounds of the au thority for t he
sanction." 124
Statemen ts such as these suggest that compensatory sanc tions are
d istinct from fines and penalties. A lthough occasionally a court may
expressly irn pose a fine or penalty u nder rule 11, 125 in most instances
the amount of a rule 11 sanction is based on the costs incurred by the
o pposing party. 126 Particular ly in these latter c ases, a court could find
that such compensatory sanctions do not constitute fines or penalties
as excluded by professional liability policies . Even if the fines imposed
are not clearly compensator y , however, courts could fi nd that the
"fines and penalties" exclusion is ambiguous and interpret it narrowly .
The same rule 11 sanction , fo r exam ple, may sometimes serve more
than one purpose, 127 and in these cases a court may justifiably doubt
w hether sanctions really should be considered fines or penalties. The
doctrines of interpreting ambiguous policy language in favor of coverage could a llow courts t o conclude th at such rule 11 sanctions are
covered under existing attorney professional liability policies. 128
A number of insurance companies, thou gh, have a ttempted to ex1 '-

'1

~ ·,

~~

1-~

121. See Ha milton, McK ee, & Levitt, supra note 7, at 525 (" T he trad iti ona l meaning of a
'fine' would seem to encompass most citations, at least th ose san ctions levied as pu nishm ent.").
] 22. Schwarzer, Sane! ions: A Closer Look, supra no re 5, a t 20 2-03.
123. Eas tway Co nstr. Co rp. v. C ity of New Yo rk, 82 1 F.2 d !21 , 12 5 (2d C ir.) (Pratt , J.,
dissenting) (di sapprovin g o f sa nc tioi1 no t based o n actua l attorneys' fees). cerr. de nied. 108 S. C t.
269 ( 1987).
124. In re Yagman, 796 F .2d 11 65, I 180-8 1, opinion amended. 803 F.2d 1085 (9th C ir.
] 986), cerr. den ied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (19 87).
125. See. e.g., D o re v. Sc hult z, 582 F. Supp. ! 54, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (" [T]he attorney for
plaintiffs is sa nct ioned in the amo un t of two hundred dollars paya ble as a fin e into the Registry o f
t his court . . .").
126. See supra note 60 and accompanyin g tex t.
127 . NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATIO N CO MMIT ITE ON F EDERAL COUR TS, supra no te
4, at 23 (77 % o f judges respo nding to su rvey "indicated that their award s o f sa nctions were
intend ed to be both compensatory a nd puniti ve/e xemp lary.").
128. See T homsen, supra note 7, at 300 ("[T]he insurance: co mpany, :.JS d ra fier of th e con tract, could have protected itse lf by specifica lly exclud in g 'sa nct ions' alon g with ' fines. pen a lt ies,
and/or punitive or exempla ry dam ages. · " ).
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sanctions. 140 If the purpose is compensation, sanctions can hardly be
considered punitive. Moreover, even the same sanction can serve
more than one purpose, prompting one commentator to note t hat "the
mixed nature of monetary sanctions, which may compensate as well as
punish, makes the characterization of sanctions as p un itive damages
fra ught w ith logical pitfalls." 14 1 For this reason, a court interp reting
an atto rney professionai 1iability policy could easi ly finc1 t h2.t rule 11
sanctions do r10t fall wi th in the excl usion for punitive or exemplary
d amages.
I nsurance policies also exclude coverage for losses arising out of
acts or omissions of the insured attorney that are dishonest, fraudulent, deliberately wrongful, criminal, or m alicious. 142 Courts im pose
rule 11 sanctions, however, even when attorneys have acted honestly
and in good faith. 143 By itself, then, a sanction under rule 11 does not
necessarily fall within the exclusion for dishonest and fraudulent acts.
To fall wit hin this exclusion, a sanction probably needs to be accompanied by a specific finding that the attorney acted in bad faith or with
malice. However, since courts need not make such a finding in order
to impose rule 11 sanctions, it is doubtful that subsequent courts
would ever know whether an attorney violated the rule in bad faith.
In cases other than those dealing with rule 11 sanctions, when it has
been unclear if an insured attorney's conduct was dishonest or fraudulent, courts have held that coverage exists under professional liability
policies. 144 Likewise, in rule 11 cases, courts may well find that coverage for sanctions under some policies has not been excluded.

C.

Is There a Duty to Defend Against Sanctions?

I n addition to indemnifying attorneys for direct losses, most profess ional liability insurance policies obligate insurers to defend and appeal any claim against the insured seeking damages which may be
140. See supra note 121 and acco mpanying tex t.
14 1. Thom se n, supra note 7, at 304.
142. See, e.g.. HOME INSURAN CE C OMPAN Y, No. HJG58 1F , LAWYERS PROFESS IONAL LIABILITY I NSURA NCE POLICY§ C.l(a) (May 1986) (excluding "disho nes t, deliberately fraud ul ent.
criminal. malici ous ly or deliberat ely wrongful acts or omiss ion s'"); INSURANCE SERV ICES OFFI CE, No. GL-00-2 3, LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL L IAB ILiTY FORM (M a r. 1981) (ex cluding "dishones t, fraudul ent, c riminal or mali cio us acts or om iss io ns")
143. See sources cit ed supra not e 50; cf Cabell v. Petty, 8 10 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 19 87)
(""Ru le 11 does not prohibit m ere ly intentional mi sco nduct. Inexperi ence, incompetence, wi llfulness o r delibera te c hoice may a ll co ntribute to a violation.").
144. See, e.g., Nat ional Sur. Corp. v. Musgrove, 3 10 F. 2d 256 (5th Cir. 1962) (exclusion in
in surance broker' s profess ional li ability policy did no! encompass cons tructive fraud), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 974 (1964); St. Paul F ire & Marin e In s . Co. v. Icard , i\1errill, Cullis & Timm , 196
So.2d 219 (Fla. Ci. App.) (coverage no t exc lud ed where comp laint aga in st t he in sured attorney
was ·'grossly in suffici ent " to justify be li ef tha t a ttorn ey's act io ns we re di s honest o r fraudulen t),
cert. de nied, 20 I So. 2d 89 7 (Fla. 1967 ); Cad wa ll e r v. New Amsterdam Casualt y Co. , 396 Pa.
582, 152 A.2d 484 (1959) (cov erage not exclud ed des pite allegations of fraud and co nspiracy
bec~use attorney' s con duct pot ential ly was not fr a udul ent).
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covered by the policy. 145 Most policies define claims simply as demands for money; 146 thus a motion for monetary rule 11 sanctions
£" 1
1 w1tnm
. ' . tne meamng or t h_e term " c lmm
. "· as roun
" d m
. a po1
wou ld~ 1a
icy's defense provision.
A lthough the typical policy only states that the insurer will defen d
claims seeking damages covered by the policy, courts have consistently
held that a liability insurer's d uty to defend is broader than its du ty to
indemni fy . 1-' 7 An insurer may be required to provide a defense even
\vher1 it \VOuld not be required to pay the final darn age a\va rd. l-~ 8 ~\s
long as a claim seeks damages that are potentially covered by the policy, the insurer m ust pay fo r a defense. 149
For this reason, some professional liability insurers may need to
defe nd attorneys against rule 11 motions even if the insurer would not
ultimately be required to indemnify the insured. In cases where coverage would be excluded only if an attorney acted maliciously, for example, such malice would not be established when a rule 11 motion is
filed. Moreover, because a court can sanction an attorney without expressly finding bad faith, there will presumably always be a possibility
of coverage, and therefore a duty to defend, in such cases.
As with the term " damages" and the various exclusions, 150 courts
1

•

"

145. See, e.g., HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, No. H36581F, LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANC E Pol.ICY § B.II (May 1986) ("(T]he Company shall defend any claim against
the Insured including the appeal thereof seeking damages to which this insurance applies even if
any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent."); INSURANCE SERVICES
OFFICE, No. GL-00-23, LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY FORM 2 (Mar. 1981) ("The company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages for
claims to which this insurance applies even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless,
false or fraudulent."); LA WYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (CALIFORNIA), LA WYERS '
PROfESSIONAL LIABILITY POLICY art. 2, § 2.2 (June 1987) ("For any Claim seeking Damages
with respect to such insurance as is afforded by the policy, the Company shall have the right to
appoint counsel and shall have the duty to defend such Claim even if any or all of the allegations
of the Claim are groundless, false or fraudulent.").
146. See. e.g. H OME INSURANCE COMPANY, No. H36581F, LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURAr'>CE PoLICY § B.I.b (May 1986) ("Claim, whenever used in this policy, means a
demand received by the I nsured for money .... "); LAWYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPAr'>Y
(C\LIFORNIA), LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL L IABILITY POLICY art. 1, § 1 (June 1987) ("Claim
means: a demand ... for money against an Insured."). But see INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE,
No. G L -00-23, LA WYERS PROFESSIONAL L IABILITY FORM 2 (Mar. 1981) (using term "suit"
rather than ··claim").
14 7. See, e.g. Conway v. Country Casualty Ins. Co., 92 Ill.2d 388, 442 N. E .2d 245 (1982);
Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 64 N.Y.2d 304, 476 N.E.2d 272, 486 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1984).
148. See Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Assn. Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 648 F.2d
914, 918 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The two duties are not coterminous and a carrier may be obligated to
defend its insured in circumstances where the damage award itself may be payable by another
insurance company, other party, or the insured himself.").
149. See, e.g. National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970) (finding that
insurer must provide a defense if the known or reasonably ascertainable facts are within, or
potentially within, the coverage of the policy); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d
168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (en bane) (finding insurer obligated to defend insured against suit
for assault because the loss was potentially within the coverage of the policy).
150. See supra sections II. A and II. B.
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may construe the duty to defend provisions of attorney professional
liability policies in fav or of coverage. Absent an explicit exclusion for
sanctions imposed und,:;r rule 11, the language in existing attorney
professional liability polici ~s gives courts room to find that the policies
cover sanctions . Rule ll sanctions serve multiple purposes and are
im posed on attorneys who a·:::;: honestly and in good faith. They do not
fit neatly in to i:radit iortt:d p~;}:i c;-/ previsions and courts may -v'.n:ll fmd
that sorne of the exis·~jng
( 0 \ier tl1e risk of rule 11 sanctior:3.
H I.

THE POTENT U:, L ril?:.R KET FOR RULE 11 INS U RANC E

Even if courts do r:ot find coverage for rule 11 sanctions under the
terms of existing pol icies, insurance companies could write new policies specifically covering rule 11 sanctions. Given the risk of sanctions
that attorneys face, one m ight expect a market to develop for such
insurance. This Part briefly analyzes the actuarial criteria of insurability and suggests t hat special rule 11 insurance may well be offered by
the market in the near futur e.
Insurance operates by shifting the risk and burden of loss from
individuals to groups of sim ilarly situated individuals. 151 Even though
risks to individuals are by nature uncertain, if a group is sufficiently
large, risks can be measured with accuracy. Insurers rely on statistical
analysis and probability theory to determine the total expected loss for
the group and, on that basis, to establish equitable premiums fo r all
individual policyholders. 1 52 Although in the abstract it is possible to
insure (i.e., to shift or spread) any type of risk, in practice insurers
only cover those risks ·which can be adequately analyzed in statistical
terms and those for which coverage would be economically feasible. 15 -'
151. K. ABRAHAM , supra no te 101 , a t 64; F. STEPHEN, supra note 85, at 146; E . VAUGHAN.
supra no te 90, at 2!.
! 52. E. VAUGHAN, supra note 90. a t 22-27 .
!53. The issue di sc ussed in this Pont o f the Note is whether rule 11 sa nctions meet t he stat istical or ac tuarial crit e ri a for in,;urabilit y . nG t the principl es o f economic feasibility. R isks that
meet th e act uari al cri te ri a are o nes that ca n be meas u red a nd predict ed w ith so m e deg ree of
accuracy. Even m eas urab le and predict a ble risks, tho ug h, must be eco nomica ll y fe as ibl e, mea ning simply that an in s urer must be <ible to make money by ins uring them. Economic feas ibil ity is
not discussed in dep th in this Part becaus~ the ri sk of rule ll sanctions would almost ce rtainlv
meet all of the foll owing four princi pks uf ec onomic feas ibility discussed in the insuran ce lit e rc;ture. F irst, to be economically fea sibk, in ~; urance should not cover catastrop hic losses such as
wars or fl oods. Rul e 11 sanctions ca n hard ly be consid e red catas trophic in t his sense. Second ,
th e pote ntial loss to indi vidual s sho ul d be nontri via l so insurers can c harge premiums large
enough to recoup admini strati ve cos is a nd profi ts. As noted supra at no te 3, the size o f rul e ll
sancti o ns and the costs of defe nding rul e ll motions a re not insubstantial. Third , the probability
of loss should not exceed 4-0 -50%, cr rhe necessary prem iums will be excess ive. Alth oug h the
frequ ency of rule 11 sa nct ions has in creased significantly in the past six years, the prob<Jb ility of
sanctions being im posed o n a parti cu lar attorney is no t close to 40 -50 % . Finall y, insura nce
premium s shou ld no t be too high , wh ich th ey probab ly would not be for rul e II co ve rage, g ive n
that th e othe r prin c ipl es o f econo mic fe<1 sibility ate sa tisfied . See generally D . B tCKELHA lJ PT,
GENERAL I N SURA NCE [4 ( llth ed. 1983); M . GRE ENE, R ISK AND INSURANCE 58-5 9 (3d ed.
197 3); G. LUCAS & R. WHERRY, I N SUR ANCE : PRINCIPLES AND COVERAGES 19 ( 1954) ; R .
M E HR , FUNDAMENT.-H.S Of lNSUR A ;,;cE 43 (2d ed. 1986); R. RIEGEL, J. M ILLER & C. \Vt L-
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To insure a risk of loss, insurers must be able to esti mate the fre quency and magnitude with whic h the loss •.vi11 occur among a given
population. 15 -+ Insurers will generally b.:; able to d;::tennine this if three
act uarial criteri a are reasonably satisf} ,~d: (1) A large number of similarly situated individ uals are exposed to the risk; (2) the loss is defi nite;
and (3) the loss is accidental ar:.d un intentional :frorn the stan d point of

th·= insured. 15 5 T.his F~2rt np~d1 i~~ thesE; cri teria in ·th e context of rule
11! and concl udes t"hat in.sur-~ng against sanctions \vi11 -be feasible.

Insurance, it is commonly sai d, is based on the 1a'vv of large numbers. 156 A large number of individ uals exposed to a similar risk makes
it possible for insurers to predict more accurately t he futu re chances of
loss to the group. This also enab les insurers to spread risk equitably
across a gro up of individ uals . 157 A large q uanti ty of data collected
over a period of ti me ma kes it more reasonab le to t hink that the frequency of loss in t he past will contin ue in the fu ture. 15 8
T he individuals principally e;cposed to the risk of rule 11 sanctions
are, of course, attorneys, 15 9 and the United States h as over 650,000
attorneys, 460,000 of whom are in private practice. 160 In addition, t he
fact that insurers a lr eady provide insurance specifically for attorneys
suggests that the number of attorneys is sufficien tly large to make reasonably accurate predictions about liability losses . Not ever y attorney,
L!AMS, i NSU RA NC E PR IN CIPLES AND P RACT IC ES : PROP ERTY AN D L IABILI TY 16- 17 (6t h ed.
1976) [herei naft er R. R IEG EL].
154 . S ee D . BICK ELHAUI'T, sup ra note [53 , Gt 13 (i"-.n i n~;urable risk "mu st pe rmit a reasonable statisti cal es tim ate of cha nce of loss and pos:;ibic va ria ti o ns fro m the es tim at e."').
155. Th ese act uari al c rite ria are not abso lute pre requisites for ins urance coverage , but rath er
a re guides used by ins urers wh en decid in g wh<1t risk s to insure. See, e.g.. D . BICKELHAUPT,
supra note I 53 . a t 14 (The '"requireme nts fo r a n ins urable ri sk are not absolute.") ; M . GREEN E,
supra not e !53, a t 55 ('"These requirem ents should not be co nsid ered absol u ~~:. as iro n rul es, but
rath er as guides ."); R. MHIR, supra note 153, ::t 4:~ (""T he criteri a of insurability a re not always
foll owed ri gidl y."); E. VAUGHA N, :;upra r;ot e 90. d 28-29. As one ':ommentator has exp lained ,
"' [t]hese crite ri a must be viewed as th e opti mum lO :1chi~v e rat her th an c harac teri s tics to be met
in eve ry instance." R. ME HR, supra no te ! 53, at 44; see also M . G REENE, supra no te 153, at 55
('These criteria " should be viewed as ideal standards, a nd not necessarily as stand a rds ac tu ally
a ttain ed in prac tice."). In fac t, accord in g to another com me ntat o r. "(m)an y common kinds of
insurance do not meet each of th e requirem ents perfe ctly." D. Btc:r. H .HAUPT, supra not e 153, at
14; see also R. RIEGEL supra note ! 53, at 17 ("[i}nsu re rs often writ e ris ks that do no t sa ti sfy
t hese . . requirement s."").
156. See, e.g. , R. ME HR, supra not<:: 153, at 44-43; R. RIEGEL. supra note ! 53, a t 18-2 1; E.
VAUG HA N, supra not e 90, at 22.
15 7. See E. VAUGHAN. supra nQ[e 90, at 2'i .
158. See M . GREEN E, supra no te 153. at 55.
159 . T he rul e do es, th o ugh, also expose c l i ent ~; to the ri s k of sanc tio ns. S ee supra note 52 and
accompa nying text.
160 . See B. C UR RA N. SU PP LEMEI"T TO THE LA \ V YEP, ST.'.T ISTI CAL R EPORT: THE U. S.
LEGAL PROF ESS ION l N 1985 ] -4 ( 1986).
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however, faces the risk of rule 11 sanctions. For example, those at torneys not involved with litigation and those who never appear in federal
court are no t exposed to the risk of ru le 11 sanctions. Jnsmers may be
able to add to the pool of data, though, attorneys practicing in the
:number of state courts that have rules of civi l proced ure that foll ow
rule 11. 161 In any case, more than eno ugh attorneys do practice before
the federal courts to satisfy th e criteri on of large numbers .
Wh at may not satisfy this criterion, however, are the data on the
fre quency of rule 11 sanction s. Such clata, where they have been col lected at all , have only been availabi e for the six years since the rule
was amended. Insurers are generally rel uctant to insure against a
new -found peril when they have no t had the " opport unity to collect
statistics over a sufficient length of time on losses resulting from this
peril. " 162 Moreover, with rule 11 doctrine and practice in flu x, it may
be harder for insurers to predict future sanction rates based on past
ones. 163 In the coming years, the rate of sanctioning may increase dramatically if lawyers become more accustomed to seeking sanctions and
if judges become more interested in im posing them.
A large pool of data spanning a long time period , however, is not
essential for insurers. When dealing with new risks, insurance companies make calculations based "upon what is sometimes called ' underwriting judgment,' and in some instances this is nothin g more than an
approximation or guess to be adjusted with the accumulation of experience." 164 Th us, although frequency da ta on rule 11 sanctions are not
as extensive as those on, fo r example, mo rtality, insurers probably still
have or can acquire enough information to make a reasonable approximation which can, if necessary, be adjusted each year.
B.

Defin iteness of Loss

In order for insurers to estimate the freq uency and magnitude of
loss, the loss itself must be defi nite and capable of being measured. 165
" In other words,' ' one commentator explains, "we must be able to tell
when a loss has taken place, and we must be able to set some value on
161. See, e.g. , ILL. C 1v. PROC. CODE ch. 110. § 2-6 11 (West Supp. 198 9); N .C. GEN . STAT.
ch. 1-A, art. 3, rul e 1 \ ( 1983); OKLA. STA T. tit. 12. c h. 39, 2011 (Sup p . 1988 ); R.I. STAT. A NN.
§ 9·29-2 1 (Supp. 1988); VA. COD E ANN. 8.01-271.1 (Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. 1-1 4-\28 ( 1988) ;
see also Oliphant , supra note 18, at 739 (c itin g state co ur t ru les sim il a r to ru le I I in Arizona,
Ken tuck y, M ic hi ga n, W isconsin , and M inn esota); cf CA L. C 1v . P ROC. CO DE§ 447 (West Supp .
1989) (rule following language of rul e 1! implem e nted in two coun ties); lvi ASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. c h . 231, 6F (West 1985) (recov ery of fees and costs fo r claims th a t a re ··wholl y in substan·
ti a!, fr ivolous, and not adv anced in good faith"); N.Y. C 1v. PR,\C. L. & R. § 8303-a (McK inney
Supp. 1989) (recove ry of cos ts for friv olo us pers ona l injury, wron gful deat h, and m edi ca l malprac ti ce claims).
162. M. GREE NE, supra note 153 , a t 55.
163 . See supra notes 24. 26-27 , 84 a nd accompan ying text.
164. D . BICK EUIAUPT, supra no te 153 , at 14.
165. See id. at \ 3 ·1 4; R. MEHR, supra note 153, at 41 - 42; E. VAU GHAN , supra not e 90, at 29.
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the extent of it. " 166 R ule 11 sa nctions obviously sa tisfy th is criterion
when a court order states a specific amount of monetary sanctions.
W hen a court im poses nonmonetary sanctions, howe ver, t he loss will
no t be defi nite and insurance will be inappropri ate. Th e d ifficulty of
insuri ng nonmon etary sancti ons, though, need not preve nt insurers
from offering coverage for the monetary sanctions that are imposed in
m ost ru le 11 cases.

C.

L oss that is A cciden tal or Uninten tional from the S tandpoint of
th e Insured

Insurers can mos t accurately make the statistical analysis and p re·diction upon which insurance relies when losses are accidental or unintentional. 167 Insurance operates best where it is reasonable to ex pect
that the past rate and magnitude of loss will continue in th e future.
Losses intentionally caused by the insured , however, are harder to predict.168 If persons alread y intentionally cause losses without insurance, they will have less incentive to prevent such losses in the future if
they are insured . 169 The resulting increased probability of loss is
termed moral hazard. 170 T his section discusses the applicabi lity of
moral hazard to rule 11 sanctions, and concludes that moral hazard is
no more of a problem with respect to rule 11 than it is in other, commonly insured areas.
T o some degree, moral hazard is a problem with any type of loss,
intentional or unintentional. Insurance coverage may, for example, diminish the economic incentives for an insured to be careful and avoid
accidental loss. Moral hazard is most serious, though, with intentional losses because insurance may enhance existing reasons for an
insured to cause loss intentionally. 171
R ule 11 sanctions, however, are not necessarily inten tional losses.
T he objective standard of the amended rule enables courts to sanction
attorneys who unintentionally, but negligently, violate the rule. Sanctions in these instances could be insu red just as losses arising fro m any
mal practice judgment based on negligence can be ins ured . 172
166. E . VAUGH AN, supra not e 90, at 29.
167. See id.; see also M. G RE EN E, supra not e 153 , at 56; G . LU CAS & R. W ERR Y, supra not e
153 , at 19; R. MEHR , supra note 153 , at 42 .
168 . S ee D. BtCKELHAUPT, supra note 153, at 13 ("Intentio nal losses ca used by th e in sured
are usuall y uninsurable because th ey cann ot be reaso nabl y predic ted . .. ." ).
169 . Cf K . ABRAH AM, supra not e 101 , at 35 ("[B] ecause insured s can control their own
behavior, they have it within their power to act inconsistently with insurers' interes ts by takin g
less ca re than th ey woul d were th ey not in sured.").
170. See. e.g , K. AHRAHAM, supra not e 101, at 14-15; E . VAUGHA N, supra no te 90, a t 6;
Paul y, The Econom ics of !'v!ora! Hazard: Commen t, 58 AM. ECON . R r: v. 53 1, 535 ( 1968);
Shave!! , On LHoral Haza rd and In surance, 93 Q.J. Ec oN. 541 (1979).
171. S ee B. BE RLIN ER, L iMITS OF INS URAH1 LlTY OF RISKS 76 ( 19 82).
172. Ind eed, professio nal li a bilit y po li cies are written to cover negli ge nt er ro rs a nd om issio ns
of att orn eys. S ee supra note 9 1 and accompanying text.
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However, attorneys can still intentionally violate rule 11.! 73 Some
attorneys rnay act uall y p e ru~ive incentives for violating it. If th .~ s e ;:;.t torneys think that vioi atiEg tb;; rule would h elp them win a case or
otherwise ad vance a clien t' s c:mse, they may willi ngly accept the risk
of sanctions, even w it h o:.;t ins uranc:.;;. The risk for these a ttorneys becom.es speculative. Like gam bling or investing in the stock mar ket ,
sp~::c~~tl at iv ~~ ris.!<.s invc)1ve t he })C:Ssib11ity of both losses arld gain ~ . 1~~
F or e xamp i~, an attorney ;vho files s. fr ivolous corn plaint risks sanctlcn.s) but b_e .~nay also gD.in a favo rab le, or at least a "~!1 1J is an ce - vs.ll..-~ t, ·t,
setrlemem from the defendant. Similarly, an attorney w h o file s bur·densome di scovery documents m ay risk sanctions if th e papers are
filed m erely to harass or delay, but ht may also gain fr om the harassmen t or de lay . 175 insurers tend io avoid insuring t hese types of speCLllative risks because doing so eliminates, or reduces greatly, th e
possibility of loss o therwise found in such risks.! 7 6 If th e possibility of
loss were covered by insurance, speculative risks would no longer really be risks at all, 177 and individuals would undoubtedly engage more
freq uently in speculative behavior.
N otwithstandi ng the problems of insuring intentional losses, the
criterion of acciden tal and uni ntentional loss is not an absol u tely necessary cond ition. ·wh ile ;'[i]t is preferable that the risk be such that
the insured cannot himself produce the event insured against or increase the probability of its h appening[,) . .. [i]f this condition .. .
were strictly ad hered to, many forms of insurance wou1d be prevented
from adequatel y exercising their legitimate functions." 178 Through
the use of deductibles, coinsurance, risk classification, a nd pricing, insurers can control the moral h azard problem. Ded uctibles are fix ed
amounts of loss below which t he insured is liable and above which the
insurer is liable. 17 9 Coinsurance schemes allocate loss on a percentage
basis between the insured and the insu rer. 180 Risk classii'ication and
17 3. S ee In re R o nco, l nc ., 105 F.R. D. 49 3,495 (N.D. Ill. 19 85) (s ubjec tive "' impro pe r pur pose" as pec t of rule II). B ut see Z a ldi va r v. Cit y of L os A ngeles, 780 F. 2d 823 (9th C ir. 1986)
(rule 11 standard is entirely object ive) .
174 . E. VAUGH A N, supra note 90, a t 8. I n co nt rast to spec ulative risks , p ure ri sk s in vo lve
only the possibility o f loss . Ex arnp!es of pure ri sks inc lude property damage a nd illness. See
generally id. a t 7-8.
175. Such an att o rn ey, ho weva, w o uld a lso face possible sa nctions und e r F E D. R . Clv. P.
26(g) whi ch covers d iscove ry req uests.
176. S ee B. BER LI NER, supra noic 171 , 8.1 80; E . VAUG HA N, supra note 90, a t 8.
177. Th is ana lysis ass um es th at th e in suran ce premium wo uld be less than th e pot e ntia!
gains. If it is no t, th en the speculat ive r is k, when in sured, would be on e of loss o nly , or a pure
ri sk. S ee supra not e 174-.
178 . R. R IEG EL, sup ra note ! 53 , at l6; see also R . i'viE HR, supra not e 15 3, a t 44 ("In su rers
.. write insu rance for which no adequate stati stics a re avail able fo r sci e ntifi c ra te m a kin g .
[a nd] they writ e cove rage wh e re the loss is not accid ental .... ").
179. See K. ABRAH ..\t-:1. supra not e 101 , at 2.
180. Fo r exa mpl e, unde r a policy in w hi c h an in surer ag rees to ind e mnify on ly 70% of t he
losses, the insmed wo ul d bea r 30 % Sec id.
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pricing often go hand in hand: cbssiiied by indi·vidual characteristics
or past experience, the risk ier insureds' conduct, the higher are their
premiums. 18 1 Thc::se dc:vic:e3 as :3tU ~ th:,->.t insured persons retain finan ·
cia] risk and are deterred frorn crenting intentional losses. ·with the
aid of these tools, insurers offer policies covering damo.ges caused by
,. ., , ,-.'1 , ·. t
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by insurance too; but if not, at 1c6.st accidental ancl :neg1ige.nt violt:1.tions
of tl-1 c rule can be . The risk
11 :z,nctio:n5 reasonably satisfies trie
dn:-ee criteria of insurability. A large number of attorneys are exposed
to a definite risk of loss wh ich the:y did not intentionally bring upon
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will res pond to this risk by of:rering insurance specifically covering rule
11 sanctions.
IV.

PUBLIC POLICY AND THE I NSURA BI LITY OF R U LE
SM'-ICTIONS

11

The likely emergence of insurance coverage fo r rule 11 sanctions
under either existing or new policies raises an important public policy
question: Should ru le 11 sanctions be insurable? Courts will face this
question in deciding whether to enforce policies that cover rule 11
sanctions, 183 as weli as in continuing to d evelop rule 11 d octrine. 18 4 In
18!. See id. a t 15.
182. See R. RIEGEL, supra note 153, at 447 (co verage available for libel); Note, Lawyers'
Professional Liability In surance: Coverage for i'(,falicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process. Libel. and
Siander. 33 S.C. L. REV. 355, 356 ( 198 i) (li st ing in s u rance pol icies th at cove r mal ic ious prosecution a nd defamation); see also, e.g.. HOME INSU RANCE C OMPANY, No. H35 !75 F, LAWYERS
PRO f- ESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURA NCE POLiCY (Sept. 1983) (malic io us prosecution covered);
CNA . No. G-42072 -D, L AW YERS PROFESSIONAL LIARll.lTY COVERA GE ait. IV (Sept. 1985)
(defamat ion and malicious prosecutior, co ve red).
l 83 . In deciding whether to enforce inscmmce polici es covering rule I l sa nctions , courts may
:ilso face a related jurisdiction a l qu estion. In sura nce pol icies are governed by sta te law, but rul e
l l is a federa l rul e. The juri sdic t im~ a l qc:es ti o n, thu s, is whe th e r st ate insurance la w is pree mpred
by the federal public pol icies underlying r uie 1!. T he Federal Rules E nab li ng A ct, under which
ru le 11 was promulgated. expressly states that th <; fed eral rul es of civi l procedure '"sh a ll not
abridge, enlarge, o r modify any sub:;tan tiv e ~ ight." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (!982) . M oreo ver, gr. nera i
conflict-of-laws principles su ggest th at f•:d era l ru les that a re m ere ly procedural have no binding
effect on sta te courts. See WRIGHT & M !I.L. ER, F EDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 14 !7
( 197 l ). State courts (and even federal court s applying st a te law) might therefore not be obligated
to consid er the p ublic pol icies unde rlyi ng ru le l l in dec iding whether to enforce a n insurance
policy that covers san ct ions. Nevertheless, sin ce the concern s rai sed by rule I l are w id ely
shared, courts faced with th e questi o n of in surability may st ill be persuad ed by, and voluntarily
recogn ize, the federal po licies presen ted by r ui e 11.
l 84 . T he insu rability qu estio n may affect rul e i I decisions at tw o level s. F irst, fede ral disc:-ic t judges who oppose rule l l in su ra nce will lik ely change their sa nction in g practices in a n
dfort to keep sanct ion s fro m being in su red . ,;,! tho ugh conceivably some of these judges will
o rder that their monetary sanctions be unin surabl e, it is mo re likely that th ey will begin to impose nonm onetary sanctions more fr eq ue ntly. Seco nd, federal appellate courts, particularly th e
United Sta tes Supreme Court, may take in su ranc e into acc ount in future att empts to ch'fify th e
role of rul e l 1 in civi l litigati on. As d iscussed i>1 the tex t infra. the multiple pu rposes of rule I l
sanctions make it diffi cult to prohibit ins uranc e coverage on publi c poli cy grounds. If the
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determini ng \vhether rule 11 sanctions should be insurable, this Part
looks again to the purposes of the rule, as well as to the publi c policy
concerns underlying it. R ule 11 presents courts with two " competing
concerns" vvhich are relevant to the question ·;_:,f insurability: " the der1· . ,
, r. .
. . J
s1re w avmc\ aous;1ve use or Lne JU .... IC1 2d proce5s ano _tne oes1re to
avoid chi ii!ng zealous advocacy ." 185 As this Part demonstrates, ins urance offers a way of balancing the comperi ng concer-ns of judicial effi ciency and creative ad vocacy, as \Vell as of accom:r odating the
multiple purposes of the ruie. Insurance >NOi_dd nc;t sign ifica ntl y hamper the punitive or deterrent purposes of ruh: 11, and the availability
of in su rance: \Vo uld actually enhance the rule's compensatory purpose.
1-\.t the same time, insurance coverage for sanct ion s would give attorneys a way of limiting the risk of rule 11 sanct ions without stifling
creative, good faith advocacy. Before turni ng to the reasons for allowing coverage of sanctions, though, it is fr uitful to consider the case
that could be made against rule 11 insurance.
A t first glance, for instance, it might act ually seem that rule 11
insurance should be prohibited. The federa l courts, after all, are seriously overburdened. 186 Over the past decade, the number of civil filings in the federal district courts has increased approximately fifty-five
percent. 187 Last year, approximately 240,000 civil cases were filed in
.
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Sup re me Court bec o mes troubled by th e availability of rul e i 1 insura nc e, it m ay seek to decl are
pu ni shm ent as the m a in purpose of th e rule, thereby stren g thenin g the case a gainst insurance.
G iven the compensatory language found in the rule, howev er, su ch a d eclaratio n would likely
require a formal amendment of th e rul e . The Supreme C ourt is a u thori zed to pro mul ga te s uch
amendm ent s under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (19 82) and cou ld amend th e rule to ma ke punishment its
gui din g purpose . For the jurisdictional reasons mentioned supra at note 183, h owever , it is questionab le wheth er th e Court has the auth o rity to go further a nd am e nd th e rule so as to prohibit
ou tright the use of insura nce cov erage for sanctions.
185. H ud so n v. Moo re Busin ess Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450, 453 (9 th C ir. 1987); see also. e.g.
In re R uben, 825 F.2 d 977, 99 1 (6th Cir. 19 87); Carlton v. Jo lly, 125 F.R.D. 42 3, 427-28 (E. D.
Va. 1989): O li phant , supra note 18, at 765.
186. A rg ument s in favor of rule 11 o ften make referen ce to the liti g io usn ess of A meri ca ns
and to the ove rburd enin g of the courts. See, e.g, Dre is & K ru mp fvlfg . Co. v. In te rnational
Ass n of i'-ib.: hinist s, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7t h C ir. 1986) (" M ou nti ng fdera l caseload s a nd grow ing publi c di ssa tisfact ion with th e costs and d ela ys of litigm ion h<:t ve :1nd e it imp er<:tiive that the
federal co urts im pose sanct io ns o n persons a nd firm s that ab use the ir ri g ht of access to th ese
court s.'"). A lth ough these problems merit con ce rn, rule 11 "was not des ign ed as a cure-all fo r
the ills o f the adv ersa ry sys tem." Nelken, supra n ote 5, at 1352. R ul e ll simply cannot, a nd
probably sho uld no t, be used to b ring fed eral la wsu its dowa to 2. mo re ma n agea bl e number. Cf
Le vin & Sobel, supra note 6 1, at 597-98; Note, The Abuse of R rile !! and Forum No n Conveniens.
7 RE V. L ITI GA TIO N 3 11, 3 17 (19 88). The causes of con tempora ry litigation's cos ts, complexities,
and d elays are relat ed to more fundame ntal aspects of our sys te m o f just ice ra ther than to the
ex isten ce of frivol o us claims and motions. S ee, e.g. A . MIL L ER. supru note 30, at 2-9 (on the
incentives fo r litiga ti on); Friedman, Litig01ion and I1s Disconlen ts, 40 M ERCER L REV. 973, 9 7783 (19 89) (on the competitive an d tactical incentives for liti gztt ion ). M oreo ver, to the ex tent th at
ru le 1! breeds add itional litigation over sanct io n award s, th e r ule may act uall y co ntribute to the
mounting burden in the courts. See generaily Schwarzer, Rule 1 i R evisited, supra no te 2, at
I 017-1 8 (discussing the problem of so- called " satellite liti gatio n" over rule 11 ).
187 . DIR ECTOR OF TH E ADMII"ISTRATIV E O FFI CE OF T HE UN ITED STAT ES CO URTS, 19 88
ANNU AL R EPO RT 114 (1 988) (table S- 8) . But cf Gal a nter , The Day Afler the Litigation Explo-
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the district courts. i ss Based on a Rand Corporation estim a te of the
average cost of a civil fiii n g, the to tal governmental ex pend iture on
civil cases last year a lo ne reached over $3 60 million . 189 }-\t L:ast so m :':
comm entat ors a t tribute a po rti on of t his burden to frivo lous fi lings :
" [T]here is considerable opinion , su pported by at least anecdotal evi-denceJ th at n1i suse and abuse of tl1e lit igation process have contributec1
'l
- 1
•"
., .
'
' d
'
] " -9 0 ..tn an 2. 1ready
to t 11e
p rob .~.e rn toT ove r cro\veleei tecersJ ·eel< ts . · 1 \
ove rb u r d ~:n e d syst em , frivolous fili ngs and motions ma~c e an ;)_JI\::?.l.dy
length y pt 'J.cess lengthier. They t::tke tjme and. energy a·'?/D.y ~fro:;r:
j udges ·=
;vhose tim e and energ y are alree1dy taxed. By un necesssri iy ty ing llp the liti gat ion process, t h ose who beh ave friv olously or abL·,sively
res tri ct ot he r parties' righ t to an effec tive process of justice. 19 '
L itigation tod ay, to paraph rase Profe ssor Lawrence F ried m an, involves vindicti veness as well as vindication . 192 Among litigat ors, notes
the chief judge of the D .C. C ircuit Courl of A p peals, the civili ty of old
is lost and the accepted strategy is to " ·,;vin at all costs ." 19 3 One federal
d istrict co urt judge describes today 's litigation process as "a con stant
flow of poorly prepared, ill-considered , and often misleading, if not
d ownright d eceptive, papers filed by a ttorneys." 194
Ru le 11 offers som e hope for dealing with this li tigation ab use. For
the rule to work effecti vely, tho ugh, its sanctions m ust h ave an impact
on attorn eys who burden t he court with groundless or abusive papers .
I nsurance cover age wou ld lessen the immed iate fin a ncia l impact of
rule 11 sanctions. 19 5 If ru le 11 sanctions were insurable, an atto rney
could t hen sh ift the d irect costs of a sanction to his insurer instead of
having to internalize these costs h imself. In this way, it wo uld a ppear
t hat insurance coverage for sanctions would diminish courts' ability to
punish at torneys fo r cond uct that violates ru le 11.
In analogou s circumstances, courts have invalidated insurance
~

~
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'

-

sia n. 46 M D. L RE v . 3 (1 986) (qu est ioni ng popular assu mpt ions abo ut the so-cal led " liti ga ti o n
exp los io n" ).
188. D IRE CTOR O F THE A D M I N IST R AT I VE OffiCE O F T H E UN ITED STAT ES Cou;:T S. sup m
note 187, CJ. t 11 4.
189. ln 19 82, the a verage cost to th e governm en t o f a ci vil case in federa l court was :5 1500. J.
K AKALl K & R. ROSS . C OSTS OF T H E CI V IL J USTI CE S YST E M x ix (1 983). Th e figur e given i n t h•:
text is ob ta ined by mult ip lyi ng S 1500 by th e nu m ber of cases fil ed in 198 8, and it as sum es tha t
th e tota l cost wo u ld be even hi gher wh en adjusted for infl at io n.
190. Sc hwa rze r, S an clions: A Closer Look, sup ra note 5, a t 182.
191. See, e.g. , G . J os E PH, supra not e 26, a t 257; W a! d, Th ree Cha llen ges
sion. 36 fE D. 8. N EWS & J. 227 , 23 1 (1 989 ).

10
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192. F riedm a n, supra note 186, at 985.
!9 3. W a id , supra not e 19 1, at 23 1.
19L',_ Sc hwarze r, R ule 11 R evisi1ed, supra

no •~ 7 ,

at 1014.

195. See I<.. A BRM! A M, supra note 10 1, at 46 (Insura nce m ay all ow so m e fi rms to ev<Jd ~
lia bility fo r the costs o f their ac tiv ity.); Ja mes, Accide nr Liabilily R econsidered: Th e !tnpacr of
Liabilily I nsurance. 57 Y ALE L J . 549, 559 (1 94 8) ("N o d o ubt the p ro tec tio n given by ins u ra nce
ma kes so me in d ivid uai s callous and every now and then a m an will admi t as mu ch in h i,; O\vn
case. " ).

376

[Vol. 88:344

coverage out o£" cor~cern for a d iminution jn f1,nan cia1 punishment. The
0 ~11nr-~,-,o r·'"•u··t ;,, Do,·/ v S';
Da, •l Fi r--"r-_ "--"A~ 1'Vfa•·irzo Insuran ,.,e
l"'Y'1- inn~sn>. :.
t'C u .. a .._,
__
........._.. v
1 ... 1 .. 1
196
Co.,
for examp1e, invaliclared z;_s agai.nsi public policy an insurance
policy thCJ.t covered a fee fo rfeiture imposed on an attorney, Perl, who
had failed to _;·~::: ·, ;;ol 2. co:r~flict of intr;rest to h~ s client. 197 Alth o ugh t he
client su. ffet,~d nc ;;t ctusJ darna ges f·rorn Per1):. breach of l1is fid u ci2~ry
dut y, Per:t \\- ~t.s -~_; _:· -_j :~r ed I () f'or feit ·i: o his forr;!er clie:nt tb.e $20}000 i:n
attorneys' f~~es ~:he hacl paicL r-fJ1~~ co urt found that th e fee forfeittl rc
constittxtecl ~
;_}.ncler t he terms of ~Perl's rnalp ractice policy,
but neverthel es:: r;C'ld that such ,:overage v-1as against public policy and
therefore voi d. in deciding whet her the fee forfe iture was insurable,
th e court ac kn owledged th at t he public policy question d epended on
the purpose of the attorney fee forfei ture, 198 wh ich in this case was
''primarily to penalize the offending attorney" for violating his client's
trustYn Such a violation, the co urt noted, is "a particula rly grave
mat ter of public concern" since it undermi nes the trust underl ying the
attorney-cli ent re1ationship. :wo T o permit insurance coverage when an
attorney violates a client's t rust Viould therefore defeat the important
punitive purpose of t he forfe iture. 201 Hacl the attorney merely been
required to pay "actual, compensatory damages," rather than a punitive forfeiture, " [c]overage in such a case v;mlld lie. " 202
M uch of th<: reasoning in Perl could be applied to the issue of in} ·-··--J..I_~
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- - -- -- -- - --- - - 196. 34 5 N .W.2d 209 (M inn 1984).
197. Interestingly, th e lv1 innesota Supreme Court enforc ed the in surance poli cy with respect
to cove rage for Pc:rl's Lnv firm, which was also named in the order impos ing th e fee fo rfeiture.
The co urt observed that "' t he po li cy co nsiderations w h ich deny cove rage to the indi vid ual offe nding lawye r d o n ot app ly with equal force to th e law firm."' Perl. 345 N.W.2d at 2 16. For thi s
reason , insuran ce cove ra ge for law firm s sancti oned under r u le 11 should raise fewe r o bjections
t ha n insurance for sancti o ned ,_:ttorneys.
198 . 34 5 l'-f.W.2d c,t 215.
199 .

3 ~-5

N.'N.2d

c~c

216.

200. 345 N .W.ld "' 216.
20i. The Peri court's •.:once m that it~surance coverage would dilute p unishm e n t is echoed in
opini ons disa llov·: in5 ir:s u;-ar,e;; co·.,:c:rage of punitive d;:una ges in ton cases . See. e.g. . A m e ri can
Sur. Co. v. (}old, 375 F 2d 523 ( 1O!h Cir i 966); Esmo nd v. L isc io. 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d
793 (1966) . In Nonhwt•;tern N atL Cas ualty Co. v. i\1cN ult y, 307 F.2d 432 (5th C ir. 1962), for
insta nce, the U.S. Cou;·t of Ap peal s for the F ifth C ircuit , app lyi ng F lo r ida and Virg ini a la w .
in validated insu;ance covengc for a $20,000 punitive damages award aga in st an intoxi cated
drive r. T he court he ld. inrL'r alia, that insurance coverage wo uld cont ra ven e the "especially
strong public policy reaso ns for ncA a il ow ing <;ocia lly irresponsib le automobile drivers to escape
the element of punishn1ent in r• Lmiti ve damages when t hey are g uili y of reck less s la ughter o r
maim ing on the highw;_;_y_·· 307 F . .2d at 44 1. Notwithstandin g concern s suc h a s these , courts in
many ot her states have ncv•::rthe le s:; perm itt ee! in surance cove 1·age for p unitive damages . See,
e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident &_ Inclcm . Co., l 08 A riz . 485, 502 P.2d 522 ( 1972); W h alen v.
O n- Deck, Ir1c., 51~ A.2cl i072 (Dei. 1986); Harrell v. Travelers lnd em. Co., 279 Or. 199, 56 7
P.2d !Oi3 ( ! 977): Ostrage r, lnsuwnce Covcrugefor Punitive Damages Assessed Against I nsured,
in PROFESSIO NAl. LJ.\ BIUTY iN SURAN CE FO R ATTORNEY S, A CCOUNTANTS , A ND INSURA NCE
BROKERS 19 86 549-63 (1 ':186) (li ndin g that 24 sta tes and th e D istrict of Co lumbi a have all owed
cove rage for punitive damag es. while on ly 15 sta tes ha ve in va lidated it).
202 . Perl. 345

r~-r.\V . 2d at ;~1 5.
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suring rule 11 sanctions. To the extent tha t ch ;:; purpose of t h ·e rul e is
to punish attorneys who burden the courts v,; ith frivolous papers, this
punishment \vill be dampened if sanc:tions 2.re insurable. Likewise, to
the exrent that rule 11 is designed to d:.: L'::r attorneys from filing frivo.1
l ous papers, e1tner oy pumsmng tn.::rn or cy req u1nng tnem to compensatt: ::<.ggrieved parties, 203 insurance cov~ ~'a.ge v1ould also dil ute the
de t :~·rr-::nt effect of tl1e ru le. Ir.: sur2.~-~c e ··;vc:'l~ -..~1 .rrts.ke tb.::: dite ~:t eco ..
n crfl,i t~ c:onsequ.ences of violatir1g ruL:: :~ 1
·>::ve::· .~, tl-)ereby cl irn ini sl-1 ~
·;~ :ln p 1eacl i ng . 2 0 '""~
ing t b~ incentives for being careful
For th i.s reason, insurance co;,;,;:r.::ge -,vod d p:-esc:nt a problem of
moral hazard .205 1f attorneys are insun::0 83<'.inst rule 11 sanctions, the
m<Hlber of violations of the rule coul d p;:; tc:oi:i:::.Jiy increc.se. 206 Such an
increase -vvould confound ru le 11'::; purpc·s:= of reducing fr ivolous behavior in the courts. Furthermore, fo r fho se :::.ttorneys who perceive a
gain to be reaped from fi ling fri volous papers (even absent insurance),
the addition of insurance coverage could fu rther di lute the deterrent
impact of rule 11 by removing much of the speculative risk.207
Despi te these concerns, the basis for proh ibiting insurance coverage of rule 11 sanctions is inadequate at the present time. Prohibiting
insurance coverage on the basis of public policy should come only
when a distinct public policy can be identified, and when it is clear
that this policy would be undermined by insurance. Yet r ule 11 is at
present based on multiple purposes and draws into play competing
policies. The reasons for wanting t o prohibit rnle 11 insurance ultimately give way under closer examination.
For instance, even with insurance, rule 11 will retain sufficient
force to deter the filing of frivolou s pa pers. An insured attorney who
lS sanctioned for violating rule 11 will not necessarily escape all
1
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203. Any means of increasing the costs of non cc mpiialK>c \V iih ru le ll c:m det e r violat ion s of
the rule. ;'>.cco rding to economi c theory, indi vidu 2ls ' '' "!'~ w mc<:·; imizc their utility and therei'or>;!
t~hoose be havio r that n1inimi zes expected lo:~s . T hi:~ thee:' [ )' o.pp·.:::~ r s lD be desc rip tive ly ~1.ccurat e.
Sec. e.g., Bruce, The Deterrent Ejj'ecrs oj~Au ron; oh ilc lttsurc r;.~'!.' und T0rt La1v: .kl Su rvey of rh e
.En1pirical Literature, 6 L . \W & POLY. 67, 91 ( 198 ..~) (rcs-=a t :.:h i i1 d i cate5-J th ;:~ t t he threc. t o f tjn es
a nd pe nalti es deters drivers fro m unsafe behavior)
204. i(. f\HRAHAM, supra no te 101, at 14 ("[O]ther thi t1gs bc: iiig ;:q u al ~ in su rance agai nst !oss
will redu ce your incentive to prevent the insured eve nt rr':'rn uc c urring .
").

205. See supra notes 170·71 and accompanying te:n.
206. It ca n never be known, however, if ins ura nce cove i·agc wo u!d lead to rnore frivol ous
papers, largeiy because it is in1possible to d~finc an d m ·::as ure fri vo lcn_!sness obj ective ly. Moreover, even if the number of sa ncti o ns increased after im <F~iiKr: bcr:~wlt ava il a ble, th is would not
aecessarily imp ly a corresponding increase in the amo unt of frivc,io us papers. The ava ilability of
insurance itself might encourage judges to impose (and la wyer;; to seek) more sanct ions, even in
the absenc e of a n increase in the amount of friv o lous pa per.
VI/. K EETON, D. D IJBBS, R.
K EETO N & D. 0\VEN, PROSSER AND KE ETON ON T HF L\ W OF TORTS 59 1 (5th ed. 1984)
[he rein aft er P ROSSEH & KE ETON ] (The ava il abi lit y of in:;urance te nds to in c rease the numbe r
a nd size of recoverie5 in some types of tort cases.).

c:;.

207. Cf Ne!ken , supra not e 5, at 1325 (Sanc ti ons :c•..:ccl ' '' ··outwe igh tl;·c benefits derived, for
example, fr om delay" in ord e r to be effective de terren: s )
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harm. 20 R Such an at torney will likely face higher insurance premiums
for coverage of both sanctions and malpractice claims, 2 09 and may
have d iffi culty in the future finding any professionai liability insurance
at alP 10 In addition, the attorney's reputation vvi111ikely be dam aged.
The fac t that attorneys spend large amoun ts of money fighti ng small
monetary sanctions suggests that the reputational effects of rule 11
rnay ser·v·e an i111port::rnt, if not criti cal, pun iti ve and (le terrent role. 21 1
~furthe rmore, ru 1e 11 gives courts flexibility to punish egregious violato rs of the rule in uninsurable ways. In particularly serious ca~;es , " an
appropriate sanction" could consist of severe nonmonetary sanctions,
such as dismissing a pleading that violates the rule, r eprimand ing the
attorney in a published opinion, referring the atto rney to a disci plinary
body, or barring the attorney from appearing in court. These nonmonetary sanctions ·,vould have a substantial punitive effec t even on
insured attorneys who violate the ruie.
Moreo ver, the insurance mechanism itself can be designed to deter
attorneys from violating rule 11. Insurers resolve the problem of
moral hazard through deductibles, coinsurance, risk classification, and
pricing.212 T he ap plication of these tools to rule 11 coverage would
minimize the adverse effects of insurance on deterrence. With deductibles and coinsurance, attorneys would still be financially responsible
for a portion of sanctions and defense costs. With accurate pricing
and risk classification, attorneys would be encouraged to avoid sanctions in order to maintain lower premiums.213
The argument that insurance would undermine rule 11 's deterrence is simply a new version of an old, generally d iscredited line of
t hought. "Throughout its history," notes one commentator, "the insurance device has been alternately hailed as a promoter of communal
20 8. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 R evisiled, supra note 2. at 1017 (desc rib ing the "pena l consequ ences" of rul e 11 sa nctions, "including injury to a law yer's reput at io n. investi gat io n by state
bar assoc iations, and adve rse effects on malpractic e ins ura nce coverage").
209. Cf Bru ce, supra note 203 , at 85 (noti ng th ai with autom obile ins uran ce "i t is beyond
d is pute tha t th e ratin g systems used by most liabilit y ins•Jre rs prov id e s ubs ta nti a l pena lties to
th ose drive rs who are conv ic ted of acc ide nt-cau sing behav io ur" ).

2 10. Sec RUL E 11 I ~> TRAN SITI ON, supra note 2, at 91 (postu lati ng that rul e 11 sa nctions
" migh t well be considered a mat eria l fac t to be consid ered in continued coverage" of an a ttorney
by a n insuran ce company).
2 11. Cj. Golden Eag le Dist ri but in g, Inc. v. Burroughs, 1nc. , 80 1 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986)
(large law firm a ppea ling $ 3, i 55.50 sa nc ti on).
212. See supra notes 179-8! and acco mpanyin g tex t.
213. SeeK. ABRAHA M, supra note 101 , at 15 (By setting high er premiums for in sureds with
mo re losses, "the insurer can create loss preventi o n in ce ntives and thereby miti ga te mo ral hazard." ), & at 44 (pr icin g and risk c lass ifi ca tion can effec ti ve ly deter losses); James. supra note 195,
a t 560 ("'Insurance compa ni es ca n a nd do adjust their rat es a nd se lect th eir risks so as to furnis h
an in cen tive towa rds sa fety."). But see Harringt on, Prices and Proji1s in !he L iability In surance
Marke l, in R. L ITAN & C W i NSTON , L!AB ILITY : PERS PECTIV ES A N D P OLICY 46 -47 (1988)
(T he lack of statis ti cal data and info rmation on ins ureds "leads to too little preventi o n a nd too
mJn y losses.").
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welfare and darn ned as a generator of evil. " 214 Fire insurance, for example, \vas originally thought to provide an incentive for arson. 215
General liability insurance, which developed late in the nineteenth
century, ;.vas at the time thought to e1irninate the "financial deterrent
against negligent and criminal acts. " 21 6 Yet by 1986 insurance compa.q ·
.
.
... propmes were w ntmg over ,o,1 -1· ·5 'oJwon
m
ne t prem mms
annua_11y ror
2 7
erty and li ability insurance, ; and co urts h ave recognized this
insurance .not only as comrnonplace, but also as val uable to society. 216
The e xtensi:.Jn of insurance coverage to ru le 1 i sa nctions should lead
to no more frivolo us conduct in the courts tha n accident insurance :h as
led to acciden\s in society at large. 2 19
Furthermore, even assuming that insurance would dimi n ish the
punitive or deterrent aims of rule 11 to some degree, prohibiting insurance on t his basis would overlook the multiple purposes attributed to
the rule . Rule 11 sanctions do more than punish or deter violators of
the ru le. Sanctions under rule 11 also compensate parties who are
forced to respond to frivolous papers. At the present time, courts disagree about the proper weight to be given ea ch of the three purposes
ascribed to ru le 11. In such a climate of uncertainty, opponents of ru le
11 insurance cannot claim that a marginal diminution in punishment
or deterrence would sound the death knell of rule 11 .
Insurance would actually contribute to the compensatory purpose
of rule 11. This contribution can be demonstrated by analogy to the
tort liability system, which is designed "to afford compensation for
injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another. " 2 20 Damage awards in tort cases are structured "to re turn the
plaintiff as closely as possible to his condition before the accident. " 22 1
By covering these damage awards in tort cases, insurance furthers the
goal of compensation. 2 2 2 Liability insurance helps guarantee that in•

.

•

(j'

214. M ci'.!ee ly. J!!egaliry as a Factor in Liabiliry Insurance. 41 COLUM . L. R Ev. 26 ( 194 i ).
215 . fd
216. ld
2 17. HarringiOn, supra not e 2 13, at 44 (based on es timates given in table 3·1 th erein ).
21 8. See inji·u

not~s

224-26 and accompanying text.

21 9. Cf R. JERRY , UNDERSTAND IN G INSURANCE LAW 35 1 ( 19 87) ("(T)here is no evidence
that the existen ce o f insurance has caus ed m o re n egligence. There is equally little likelihood th a t
th e existen ce of in s ura nce for reckless or wanton ac ts would ca use m ore reckless or want o n
behavi or. " ).
220. Wright, lnr roducrion 10 th e Law of Torts. 8 C AMBRIDG E L.J. 23 8 (1 944); see also L it an,
Swire & W in ston , supra note 83, a t 3- 4: Seavey, Book R ev iew, 45 HARV. L. REv. 209, 211
(1931) ("Ton liability ... exis ts chi efly to com pensat e an individual, as nearly as may be. for loss
caused by the defendant's co nduct.").
221. M. FRA~~K U N & R. RABI N , CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND A LTERNA also Ca vn a r v. Quality Contro l Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 552
(Tex. 198 5) ("The primary obj ec tive of aw arding dam ages in civi l actions has a lways been to
compe nsat e th e injur<:d plaintiff', rather than to punish the d efendant.").
T IVES 597 (4 th cd. 1987); see

222. Cf J ames, supra no te 195, at 550 ("The best a nd m os t effic ient way [to dea l wit h human
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jured parties will be corn.pensated for damages suffered .223 Such insurance is "regarded more and more as a dev ice for providing fu nds to
meet the needs of injured persons and less and less as a dev ice for the
protection of the insured." 22 " F oe this reason, 225 a number of states
require automobile owner:; to carr y tort liability insurance. 226 In the
law of torts, liabilicy
advances the aim of compen:sation.
Insurance CO\'erage
(Ule 11 sar.ctio ns -v.Jould similarly
the compensatory purpos-::
th e rul~ . '}. . he Dresence of instlr;:.rr1ce cov ~
erage for sanctions
conJ pensation to tl1e 'birtjtlrecr} fJa rt y
regardless of an attorn;;;y' s il.n2:::.cial condition. 227 Admittedly, insurance for rule 11 sanctions iT1a y seem less necessary for compensation
purposes than does insurance fm-, say, autornobile: accidents. 223 Even
so, courts do consider atto rneys' ability to pay in establishing san ction
awards and on this basis have awarded less than full compensation in
some cases. 229 If insurance vvere available, courts could aband on the
extra consideration of ability w pay and could award amounts that are
fu lly cornpensatory. On the basis of com pensation, therefore, insurance coverage for ruie 11 san.ctions should be permitted, if not
encouraged.
Since rule 11 presently has multiple purposes - one of which
would actually be furthered by the availability of insurance - a complete prohibition on rule 11 insurance is not justifiable at this time.
Neverth eless, a partial prohibition could still be advanced. Recognizing that insurance would contribute to compensation, but assuming
that it would diminish punishment to som e degree, it m ight make
sense to ailmv rule 11 insurance for com pensatory sanctions, but not
for punitive ones. 230 T heoretically, this lim ited insurability approach
could best accommodate rule 11 's multiple purposes. Since insurance
coverage will advance th e compensatory purpose of rule 1 L then comlosses] is to assure accident victims of compensation, and to distribute the losses involv ed over
society.").
223. SeeR. IV1EHR, supra note l5J : at 155.
224. McNeely, supra nott 2.14. a t 60.

225. See

PROSSE .R

&

i<~:::ETC)Y..i,

supra note 206. at 600.

226. !d. at 602-03.
227. Cf G. JosEPH, supra note 26. at 79 (noting that ir;surance could be one potential way to
ensure that rule 11 victims arc comvn:sated).
228. See James, supra note i 95. at 563 (arguing that accident liability insurance has "increased the chances of compensation to the victim in cases where someone is legally liaole to him
for damages").
229. See, e.g., Johnson v. l\k;\'J '{ :Jr~-: City Transit i\uth., 823 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1937)
(courts may take ability to pc:y into consideration); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1231
(2d Cir. 1986) (rwting in dictum tbt courts can consider an attorney's ability to pay), cert.
denied. 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Doe v. Keane, 117 F.R.D. 103, 107 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (awarding
only half the requested fees to avoid "financial ruin"' of offending attorney).
230. Cf K. ARROW, l!!surance. Risk. and Resource Al!ocarion. in ESSAYS lN HIE Tm: ORY
143 (1971) (discussing reasons for partial risk-shifting).
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pensatory sanctions should defin itely be insur able. 2 3 1 Indeed, covering
compensatory d amages is w h at insurance d oes all the tirne. When it is
necessary, though, to punish lawyers for egn::gio us co nr'uct, insurance
might be prohibited. 23 2 In such cases, attorneys·-- r?,th er than in surers - would bear the brunt of the san;:;t ions.
T his limited ins urability approach vwuld gi ve s;.w : neys the benefit
of insuran ce co·verage for tl1e costs of cl:~fc:-_:_ d..ing :;_" U ~<;~ I 1 n'lotions) 233
\V hich ir1 IT1 a 11 Y cases .n1ay "'vYe11 excc:: : d th i~ a.rr;. o J.li~ -~ c<f t:h e sancti ons
thernselves. ·v'/ h er:. a lJ01icy covers c1 ~':f.:r:.se costs} cfu: iz1surer :has a duty
to d efend any claim that potentiai1y fa Ls 'Hithin
coverage of the
poiicy . 1Jnder a lim ited insurability o.pproac h , a ny 1ule 11 motion
. .i. ]'/ :u;u.t
(' "'1 \V1t
. 1.
1
,..
1'
.
.
ld not
cou1ld potentiB
11n t ne coverage Of a p o.<.1cy , s1nce rt cou
be knc·'t.vn u·ntil .afte r a judge issues an order i.f the ~>a:n ctions \Vo uld be
compensatory or puniti ve.
D~spite these advantages, however, ~i li mited insu rability a pproach
would probably be un workable at the present time. Given the m ultip le pur poses rule 11 serves, it will not always be clear ·whether a particular sanction is com pensatory or punitive. The ss.me sanction, for
example, often serves more than one purpose. 2 34 For a limited insurability a pproach to work, judges would need to make findings that set
out one prirnary purpose for the sanctions they im pose. 2 35 I n order to
make such findings, trial judges would need further guidance on the
role of rule 11. Judges would need to know how punitive sanctions
differ from compensatory ones, and when each type is justified. One
possibility would be to allow t he imposition of uninsurable punitive
sanctions only when an attorney acts in bad faith .2 36 A bsent another
amendment to rule 11 , though, such a distinction could confl ict with
t he discretion the rule grants judges in crafting an " a ppropriate" remedy . 2 3 7 In practice, implem enting a limited insurability approach
·wo uld prove cumbersom e at th is time.
Unless courts can develop clear standards :for imposing puni tive
- - - -- - - - -- - - - - - -- -

·-·- - -

--

-- - - --

231. Cf P erl v. St. Pa ul Fire & M ar ine in s. C o ., 3·+:i N .'V .2 d 209, 215 (Ivli nn . 198L!) (d ic ta )
(:.!c tual , co n1pensatory damages flowing frorn at torne y's bre:::tch of hi :; fi ducia r y duty \vould be
in surabl e) .
2J2. Cf Per!, 345 N.W .2d at 2i5-16 (holdi ng ul' insura ble
on attorney for breac h of fi duc i<>ry duty).

2.

pu ni tive f•::e forfei ture imposed

233. Sec supra no tes 145-50 and a ccornp,m ying k .:;t.
234. See supra no te 127.
235. In so me circuits, di s trict co urt judges af·~ a lre:ad y rf:q uired to de ta il the reasons for
ii11posin g sanct ions, e•.:en if not the precise pur pose th e saJlCt ion i:.. int ended to further. See, e.g.,
Bro wn v . Fed e ration of State M edi ca l Bds., 830 F 2d ; ,~29, 14 33 (7t h Cir. 19 8 7); Lieb v. Topsto ne Ind us. , Inc. , 788 F.2 d 151, 15 8 ( 3d C ir. 1926).
236. Such a bas!s for punitive sanc ti ons wo uld cornpon "Nith the bas is fo r 3\Va rdi ng punitive
d amages in to rt cases, whe re someth in g more th::m mere negl igenc e is requ ired. S ee generally
PROSSER & KE ETO N, s11pra note 206, a t 9- iO. Punit ive da m a ges. th Gugh, a re insurab le iil ap·
prox im a tely two thirds of the states that have consi dered th·~ qu est ion. See Ostrag er, supra note
20 l, a t 549-63.
237. Sec supra not es 52 -53 ~:nd accon1pa nying text.
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versus com pensatory sanctions, or until it can be shown that t he overriding purpose of rule 11 will be substantially undermined by insurance, the basis for any prohi bition of rule 11 in suran ce will remai n
inadequate. Because any prohibition of rule 11 insura nce is presently
premature, it is important nm:v to consider an independent justifi cation
for allowing ins urance coverage of rule 11 sanctions. A llowing coverage for sa.nctions would lead to a better balance betv;een the compet ing concerns of creative advocacy and efficient judicial process.238
\Jli th insurance coverage, the filing of frivolous papers would stil l be
suffic iently discouraged, but the chilled advocacy curren tl y associated
with the rule would be al leviated.
A lthough designed to deter frivolousness, rule 11 was "not in tended to chill an attorney 's enthusiasm or creati vity in pursuing factual or legal theories." 23 9 M an y courts and commentators believe,
ho wever, that the rule as it curren tiy operates threatens enthusiastic
and creative advocacy .240 As rule 11 sanctions grow larger and more
prevalent, and as the standards fo r imposing them remain uncertain,
the risk that an attorney will be sanctioned increases. T o red uce this
risk, attorneys may avoid fi ling claims or making arguments based on
creati ve, but still potentially legitimate, factual or legal theories.24 1 In
23 8. I n more fo rma l terms, thi s m ea ns that insura nce coverag e o f sa nc tions woul d lead to a
mo re o ptimal level of de terrence. A n op tima l deterrence level is one a t wh ich soc ia ll y und es irabl e act ivity, suc h as th e fi lin g o f frivolo us pape rs, is m inimi zed , b ut soc ia ll y desirable activity ,
s uch as vigorous a nd c rea ti ve ad vocac y, is m ax imi zed .
23 9. FED. R . Clv. P. II ad visory co mmittee's note.
240. See. e. g. , T homas v. C a pi ta l Sec. Servs., In c ., 83 6 F.2d 866, 88 5 (5th C ir. 19 88 ) (en
bane) (" I f abused , R ul e II may chill a tt o rn eys' enthusias m and stifl e the c reativity o f liti ga nts in
p ursu ing n ovel factua l or legal th eori es ."); Szabo Food Serv. , Inc. v. Ca nt een Cor p., 823 F. 2d
10 73, 1082 (7 th C ir. 1987) ("Ru le 11 c rea tes difficul ties by simult a neo usly requirin g co urts to
pe na lize fri vo lous s uits a nd protec t ing compla ints th a t, a lt hou gh no t s u pported by exis tin g law .
are bo na fide effo rts to change the law. " ). cert. dismissed, 108 S. C t. 110 1 ( 1988) ; I n re Y agm a n ,
79 6 F.2d 1165, 11 83 ( in va lidatin g a $250,000 sa ncti o n because, inter alia. its size ·· pose[d ] a
d irect th rea t to th e ba la nce betwee n sanct ioning imp rope r behavior a nd chilling vi go ro us ad voca cy. " ), opin ion am ended. 803 F. 2d ! 0 85 (9t h C ir. 1986), cert. denied. 108 S. C t. 4 50 ( 198 7);
Lev in & Sobel, supra no te 6 1, a t 593 ; N elken , supra not e 5, a t 133 8 -43 (c h illi ng effec t o f sa nc tio ns); Sc h wa rzer, Sanclions: A Closer L ook. supra no te 5, a t 184 ("[i ]mpos ing sa nc tio ns o n
lawye rs fo r th ei r co nduc t o f litiga tion ra ises th e spec tre o f c hillin g ad vocacy ."); N ot e, Plamible
Pleadings. supra no te 5, a t 64 1-42 (ch illing effect of sa nc tions); Not e, R easonable Inqu iry Under
Rule I I - Is 1he S 1op. Look, an d ! n vesliga le Requirem ent a Litigw11 's R oadblock?, 18 I ND . L.
REV . 751 ( 1985) (sa m e); No te, Applying R ule 11, supra no te 5, a t 9 11-22 (sa me); Ro th s te in &
W o lfe, Jnnov{J[ive A /l orn eys Starling 10 Feel Chill From N ew R ule 11. Lega l T imes, Feb. 23 , 19 87,
a t ! 8 (sa me). As a ma tt er of emp irica l a na lysis, howeve r, it ma y be nex t to im poss ib le to assess
the full ex tent of th e ch illi ng effect , if a ny, c rea ted by th e rul e. S ee, e.g. . E lso n & Ro th sc h ild,
supra no te 33, a t 365 ; Nelke n, supra note 5, at I 339-40; N o te, Applying Rule 11. supra no te 5. at

922
24 1. See, e. g.. L evin & Sobe l, sup ra no te 61, at 593 (" [T]he m ore seve re th e sa nc ti o ns imposed , the g rea ter th e ri sk of a ch illin g etfec t. "); R o thstein & Wo lfe, ,wp ra no te 240 , at 18- 19
(" A tto rn eys uns u re of th e bo un d a ries o f R ul e II 's swee p m ay begin refus in g to ta ke no ve l o r
ri sky, b ut arguably me rit ori o us, cases fo r fea r of be in g perso na ll y sa nc ti o ned ."); No te , Plausible
Pleadings, supra no te 5, a t 639 (" Co nfl ic ting notio ns o f pla usibili ty, as much as o ver ly na rrow
on es, ha ve a chillin g effec t o n liti gat ion, leading pru den t lawyers to stee r w id e of ev en potential
imp lau sibilit y by a vo id ing filing non sta nda rd clai ms.") .
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an adversa ry system, a substantial social cost develops when attorneys
begin to argue less vigorously and creatively. 2 42
Some commentators have suggested th at rule 11 restricts the filing
of suits in practice areas that fre quentl y involve novel factual or legal
arguments. 24 3 Ru le 11 sanctions poten tia lly inhibit the filing of civil
rights suits, for example, because attorneys in these cases appear to
have been sanctioned m o re frequen tly than those in other areas of the
law_H-> The uncertain t hreat of sanctions may also keep attorneys
from making vigoro us or creat ive a rguments in the suits they do file.
The effectiveness of our procedural system depends on vigorous
represe ntation of clients by attorneys .245 A rule so harsh that it stifles
advocacy contravenes the broader policies underlying an adversarial
system of justice. Furthermore, a rule that discourages, even unin te ntionally, the making of novel arguments strikes at the essence of a
common law systemY 6 The effectiveness and fairness of the la w depends on innovatio n : "Our society is changing, and law, if it is to fit
society, must also change." 247 Common law courts not o nly can make
law where none existed before, but can " modify[] or replac[e] what
h ad previously been thought to be the governing rule w hen applying
that rule would generate a malignant result in the case at hand ." 2 4 8
Under such a system , the law is inherently in flux and an objective
assessment of what constitutes a frivolous legal argument seldom
242 . S ee. e.g., Th omas v. C a pita l Sec. Se rvs., In c., 836 F.2d 866, 885 (5th Ci r. 1988) (e n
bane) ; L evin & Sobel, supra note 61, at 593 ; Weiss, A Practitioner's Com m ent on th e Actual U5e
of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 ( 1985 ).
243. S ee La France. Fede ral Rule II and Public In terest Litigation. 22 VAL. U. L. R EV. 33 1,
333-34 ( 19 88); Note , Rule II: Has th e Objective Standa rd Transgressed the Adversary System?,
38 CAS E W. RES. L. REV. 279 , 283-84 (1987).
244. S ee, e.g.. Woodrum v. Woodward Cty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (4 th Ci r. 1989); Ne lke n,
supra note 5, at 1340; Vairo . supra not e 2, at 200-01 . Civil rights cases acco unt ed fo r on ly 7.6%
of th e civil filings from 1983 to 1985. but accounted for 22.3 % of the rul e II cases d uring th e
sam e period; in contrast , contract cla ims acco unt ed fo r 35.7% of a ll cases, but on ly 11. 2% of the
rule II cases. Ne lken. supra note 5. at 1327. On the d iffi cu lty o f ext rapo lat in g fr om th ese data,
however, see T. W iLLGJNG, supra no te 3, at 160-63.
245 . In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1182 ('" (W)e embrace the fact that zeal o us ad vocacy is
the attorney's ideal. Hard-fought , energet ic and ho nes t represe nt a ti on is at the bed rock of our
jud icial process.'"), opin ion amended. 803 F.2d 1085 (9t h Cir. 1986), cerr. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450
( 1987); S. L-\.NDSMAN , THE A DVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCR IPTION AND DEFENSE 44-4 7
(1984); Fu lle r, The Adversary Sysrem, in TALKS ON AME RI CAN LA W 34. 35- 36 (H. Be rm an 2d
ed. 1971 ) .
246. See, e.g.. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. C it y of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Ci r. 1985)
("V ita l c hanges have been wro ught by those members of the bar who have da red to c h a ll enge the
received wi sdo m, a nd a rul e that pena lized such inn ovation and indus try wou ld run counter to
our notions of the co mmon law itself. '" ); Weiss , supra note 242, at 23 (Creat ive advocacy '"b rings
about meaningful chan ges in the law, c han ges which soc iety requires in o rd e r to m ove forwa rd .
Unfortunately, I be li eve Rule 11 may st ifle this evo lu tio na ry process.").
247. K. LLEW ELLYN,

BR,\ ~ J HL E

BusH 66 ( 1960).

248. Schauer, Is rh e Cummun Law Law? (Book Rev iew), 77 C ALIF. L. R Ev . 455 (19 89 ).
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comes easily. 249 As one comElentator noted, "[t]oday's fr ivolity may
be tomorrow's law, and the lavv often gro'."'S by an organic process in
which a concept is conceived ,
de rided as absurd (and clearly not
the law) , then accepted as fi'Jeoretically tenable (though not the law),
and then accepted as the lm;v." 25 c
such a legal system, attem pts to
identify fri volous concl-uct, and t h:::t ::o punish th.ose who engage in it,
wiil necessari ly creat e a ri.:;l·:
'.vho 9.rgue for legal change.
Rather than have attorneys e ,,J;d maki ng innovat ive claims in order to reduce the risk of .• !...il ': 11 : :. 2\nc:tie;ns, it would be better to a llow
them to obtain rule 11 insuratu::,";. Insurance coverage offers a way of
balancing the policy of jud icial cff'ic:J·ency with the competing policy of
vigorous, innovative advocD.cy .
d ·: terrence of rul e 11 will still t;x ist, but its harshness will be controlle:J. \Vithout insurance, the r isk of
sanctions may prevent attorneys from presenting innovative, but still
good faith , solutions to leg;aJ. an d 3ocia1 problems. '0/ith insurance,
attorneys will more likely offer such solutions. W hereas rule 11 presently works to enhance judicial e:ftciency at t h e expense of advocacy,
the availability of insurance v;mdd preserve vigorous advocacy while
sti11 allowing rule 11 to help s trear~line the litigation process.
CONCL USION

Attorneys face a growing risk of rule 11 sanctions . The rule's
broad standards have led to uncertainty about what t ype of behavior a
judge will fin d sanctionable. :F urthermore, t he absence of any meaningful consensus over the primary purpose of rnle 11 has exacerbated
the uncertainty surrounding the: :cul,e. As t he number and size of ru le
11 sanctions continue to grmv, attorneys will likely look for insurance
as a way of shifting the ris k of sanctions.
Attorneys may weli find insurance for rule 11 sanctions under their
existing p rofessional liability policies. Some of the existing policies
can be viewed as ambiguous when applied. to rule 11, an d courts rnight
t herefore interpret t hese policies to iDclucle coverage for rule 11 sanctions. Professional liability policies co ver "damages'' arising out of
acts or omissions of the ins ured attorney, and compensator y sanctions
might well be t hought of as svch damages . T his compensatory element of rule 11 could also i:akt ~;anc;'i ons out of t he scope of traditional
exclusions for "fines or penalties" and "punitive or exemplary damages ." Furthermore, as judges can and do sanction attorneys for simple negligence, it is unclear vvhether coverage for sanctions should be
denied by exclusions for "dishonest o:r fra ud ulent acts." Given the
doctrines that dictate interprering 2nnbiguous insurance policy Jan249. Cf Levinson, supra not e 32. at 369 -77 (d !sr: ussing the difficulties o f assess in g frivo li ty in
legal argu m entat ion).
250. Ris in ge r, supra note 14, a t 62 .
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guage in favor of coverage, courts rn ay well i'l:nd tb;:n some profe ssional
li ability policies co·ver ru1e 1 J. sar1ct ions.
Even if courts do n ot fi nd th<J.t existing professional liability poli<::.:ies cover sanctio·n s, in.surance compB.nie.s n"j ay offer ne"·iv policies specirl.ca11y covering ru1e 11 sanctions . Rule 11 sa nctions generally satisfy
the t!1:cee actuarial critcri;;1 for in s1J r:~1 ~0le tosses. A lar ge 11 ·~ ; .::o b e r of attorn.eys ar-~ exposed to ·t ~t-{f: :r .i.s~~ ·:rf s~.:fl_:·: t:i.ons . l~-h(: 1.c; sse :~: fTorn rule 11
sa:n.ctioi?.S are defin ite ar~d ~.:lr-~ :n zrt .n-~c -.:=ss:;tril y i n ten tionc~ l from the
srandpoirrt of the insur-ed . ,.-L--~h e ra i·~ d o:~r1n~ss of rule 11 s:::tnc·t ic;ns exposes attorneys to an u ncert 2:.i. n pote:nf, a l lia bilit y on which insurance
companies may likely ciecid e to capi'ta1 ize by offering rule 11 coverage.
T he likelihood that existing or new in su ranc~;; policies wiil cover
rule 11 sanctions raises the quescion of whether such ins urance should
be allowed. At the present time, co urts sho ul d permit attorneys to
obtain and rely upon ru le 11 insurance. Althou gh at first giance it
might seem that insurance would sharply diminish the rule's punitive
or deterrent effect, rule 11 will retain substantial force wi th the availability of insurance. In any case, even assum ing insurance wou ld lead
to some decrease in punishment or deterrence, it is not clear that this
should outweigh the positive contribution insurance wo uld make to
rule 11 's compensatory purpose. Until courts agree on a specific, overri di ng purpose of rule 11, prohibiting insurance coverage on public
policy grounds will be premature.
A llowing insurance for sanctions makes sense not only because of
the uncertainty surrounding ru le 11 's main purpose, but also because
insurance would alleviate the chilling problem currently associated
with the rule . C hilled advocacy threatens fundamental values of our
adversarial and common law system of justice. The availability of insurance for rule 11 sanctions \VOuld alleviate this threat, while stiil
allowing the rul e to regulate litigation abuse etTectively.

-- Ca ry Coglianese

